The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Experimenting with the acting self
Abstract
Recent neuroscientific research has developed the concept of the embodied agent as a scientifically viable approach to the psychological concept of the self. Both the awareness of one's own actions and awareness of one's own body are necessary conditions for the experience of selfhood. The relative contributions of efferent and afferent information in self-awareness are yet to be fully understood. We review experimental evidence that highlights the phenomenological and functional differences between the "acting self" and the "sensory self." These differences may underlie the ubiquitous modulation of perception in voluntary action. We focus on three main research fields: somatosensory perception, time-awareness, and self-recognition. A series of experiments, designed so as to dissociate afferent from efferent information, are reviewed. As a whole the results suggest that intentional action functions as a general context for awareness, modulating the perception of one's own body. The "acting self," owner of the efferent information, modulates the phenomenal experience of the "sensory self" because of the intrinsically agentic nature of voluntary movement. Finally, it is suggested that this sense of agency is efferent-driven, originating from pre-action processes.
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Citations
Cites
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“In this context, agency is defined according to the phenomenological distinction between “sense of agency” and “sense of ownership” proposed by Gallagher (2000a, 2000b) .”
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Cited by
The rubber hand illusion revisited: visuotactile integration and self-attribution
Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2005) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance · doi:10.1037/0096-1523.31.1.80 · Cited by 1,328
Self-citationBeyond the comparator model: A multifactorial two-step account of agency
Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., & Newen, A. (2008) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.03.010 · Cited by 1,050
Neural signatures of body ownership: a sensory network for bodily self-consciousness
Tsakiris, M., Hesse, M. D., Boy, C., Haggard, P., & Fink, G. R. (2007) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhl131 · Cited by 625
Self-citationHaving a body versus moving your body: How agency structures body-ownership
Tsakiris, M., Prabhu, G., & Haggard, P. (2006) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.09.004 · Cited by 622
Self-citationThe “sense of agency” and its underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms
David, N., Newen, A., & Vogeley, K. (2008) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.004 · Cited by 506
Metadata
- Authors
- Tsakiris †, M., & Haggard, P.
- Venue
- Cognitive Neuropsychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2005-05
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 3-4
- Pages
- 387-407
- ISSN
- 0264-3294 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0627
- OpenAlex
- W2158991362
- Cited by
- 193
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 4.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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