Cited by 482Emotions and Moral BehaviorExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDeception detection and forensic psychology

The effects of feelings of guilt on the behaviour of uncooperative individuals in repeated social bargaining games: An affect-as-information interpretation of the role of emotion in social interaction

Ketelaar, Timothy, Tung Au, Wing·2003·Cognition and Emotion

Abstract

In two studies we found that feelings of guilt provoke individuals to cooperate in repeated social bargaining games (a prisoner's dilemma in Study 1 and an ultimatum game in Study 2). Feelings of guilt were either experimentally manipulated (Study 1) or assessed via self-report (Study 2) after participants had played one round of a social bargaining game. As predicted, individuals who experienced feelings of guilt (compared to individuals who felt no guilt) after pursuing a non-cooperative strategy in the first round of play, displayed higher levels of cooperation in the subsequent round of play (even one week later). Results are discussed in terms of an "affect-as-information" model, which suggests that non-cooperating individuals who experience the negative affective state associated with guilt in a social bargaining game may be using this feeling state as "information" about the future costs of pursuing an uncooperative strategy. Because in guilt the focus is on the specific, individuals are capable of ridding themselves of this emotional state through action (Lewis, 1993, p. 570).

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Crossref · 10.1080/02699930143000662

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  • In interpersonal contexts, guilt can motivate engagement by making individuals feel responsible for another's well-being.

    “In interpersonal contexts, guilt can motivate engagement by making individuals feel responsible for another's well-being (Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton 1994; Ketelaar and Tung Au 2003).”

    From Emotional Manipulation by AI Companions (2025) · cites this paper as Ketelaar and Tung Au 2003

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Authors
Ketelaar, T., & Tung Au, W.
Affiliations
  • University of California, Los Angeles (US)
  • b The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China
Venue
Cognition and Emotion
Published
2003-01
Volume
17
Issue
3
Pages
429-453
ISSN
  • 0269-9931 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-0600
OpenAlex
W2007393367
Cited by
482
References
5
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 38 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 28 · 2016: 33 · 2015: 28 · 2014: 30 · 2013: 36 · 2012: 24
FWCI
8.32
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Cognition & Emotion (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Deception detection and forensic psychology
Keywords
guilt, cooperation, repeated games, prisoner's dilemma, ultimatum game, affect-as-information, emotion regulation

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