The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Re-Inventing Ourselves: The Plasticity of Embodiment, Sensing, and Mind
Abstract
Recent advances in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience open up new vistas for human enhancement. Central to much of this work is the idea of new human-machine interfaces (in general) and new brain-machine interfaces (in particular). But despite the increasing prominence of such ideas, the very idea of such an interface remains surprisingly under-explored. In particular, the notion of human enhancement suggests an image of the embodied and reasoning agent as literally extended or augmented, rather than the more conservative image of a standard (non-enhanced) agent using a tool via some new interface. In this essay, I explore this difference, and attempt to lay out some of the conditions under which the more radical reading (positing brand new integrated agents or systemic wholes) becomes justified. I adduce some empirical evidence suggesting that the radical result is well within our scientific reach. The main reason why this is so has less to do with the advancement of our science (though that certainly helps) than with our native biological plasticity. We humans, I shall try to show, are biologically disposed towards literal (and repeated) episodes of sensory re-calibration, of bodily re-configuration and of mental extension. Such potential for literal and repeated re-configuration is the mark of what I shall call "profoundly embodied agency," contrasting it with a variety of weaker (less philosophically and scientifically interesting) understandings of the nature and importance of embodiment for minds and persons. The article ends by relating the image of profound embodiment to some questions (and fears) concerning converging technologies for improving human performance.
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Cites
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The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition
(2014) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315775845 · Cited by 907
Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process
Sutton, J. (2010) · The Extended Mind · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0009 · Cited by 396
Homuncular Flexibility in Virtual Reality
Won, A. S., Bailenson, J., Lee, J., & Lanier, J. (2015) · Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication · doi:10.1111/jcc4.12107 · Cited by 258
Dimensions of integration in embedded and extended cognitive systems
Heersmink, R. (2015) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-014-9355-1 · Cited by 191
A phenomenology and epistemology of large language models: transparency, trust, and trustworthiness
Heersmink, R., de Rooij, B., Clavel Vázquez, M. J., & Colombo, M. (2024) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-024-09777-3 · Cited by 91
Metadata
- Authors
- Clark, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-05
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 263-282
- ISSN
- 0360-5310 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2109512349
- Cited by
- 190
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 3.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.