The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Intuition in Judgment and Decision Making: Extensive Thinking Without Effort
Abstract
We claim that intuition is capable of quickly processing multiple pieces of information without noticeable cognitive effort. We advocate a component view stating that intuitive processes in judgment and decision making are responsible for information integration and output formation (e.g., preference, choice), whereas analytic thinking mainly guides input formation such as search, generation, and change of information. We present empirical evidence corroborating this notion and show that integration of information and preference formation works without cognitive control and is unconstrained by the amount of encoded information and cognitive capacity. We discuss the implications of our findings for the bounded rationality perspective and the multiple strategy approach to judgment and decision making. Finally we outline a connectionist framework for integrating intuitive and analytic thought processes.
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Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 · Cited by 9,984 · cited 1×
“They cope with cognitive limitations by leaving out effortful information processes, reducing the amount of information considered or, in short, by reducing complex judgments to simpler ones (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, p. 207).”
BackgroundJudgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences.
Zajonc, R. B. (1980) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.35.2.151 · Cited by 8,094
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1993) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173933 · Cited by 3,487
Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree.
Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. (2009) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/a0016755 · Cited by 2,443
Adaptive strategy selection in decision making.
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1988) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.14.3.534 · Cited by 1,955
Neural correlates of decision variables in parietal cortex
Platt, M. L., & Glimcher, P. W. (1999) · Nature · doi:10.1038/22268 · Cited by 1,721 · cited 2×
“To drive this argument to the extreme, many studies show that even monkeys ( Platt & Glimcher, 1999 ) and sticklebacks ( Kunzler & Bakker, 2001 ) make choices indicating an integration of information in a weighted compensatory manner.”
Background
Cited by
Extending Signaling Theory to Rhetorical Signals: Evidence from Crowdfunding
Steigenberger, N., & Wilhelm, H. (2018) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2017.1195 · Cited by 326
A new intuitionism: Meaning, memory, and development in Fuzzy-Trace Theory
Reyna, V. F. (2012) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500002291 · Cited by 321
Trust: An Integrative Review from a Person–Situation Perspective
Thielmann, I., & Hilbig, B. E. (2015) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/gpr0000046 · Cited by 259
Metadata
- Authors
- Betsch, T., & Glöckner, A.
- Venue
- Psychological Inquiry
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2010-11-30
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 279-294
- ISSN
- 1047-840X (ISSN-L)
- 1532-7965
- OpenAlex
- W2089718312
- Cited by
- 180
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 6.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.