The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Individual Differences in Framing and Conjunction Effects
Abstract
Individual differences on a variety of framing and conjunction problems were examined in light of Slovic and Tversky's (1974) understanding/acceptance principle—that more reflective and skilled reasoners are more likely to affirm the axioms that define normative reasoning and to endorse the task construals of informed experts. The predictions derived from the principle were confirmed for the much discussed framing effect in the Disease Problem and for the conjunction fallacy on the Linda Problem. Subjects of higher cognitive ability were disproportionately likely to avoid each fallacy. Other framing problems produced much more modest levels of empirical support. It is conjectured that the varying patterns of individual differences are best explained by two-process theories of reasoning (e.g. Evans, 1984, 1996; Sloman, 1996) conjoined with the assumption that the two processes differentially reflect interactional and analytic intelligence.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.39.4.341 · Cited by 6,544
Human Cognitive Abilities: A Survey of Factor-Analytic Studies
Carroll, J. B. (1993) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511571312 · Cited by 4,121
Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232669 · Cited by 4,042
Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious
Epstein, S. (1994) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.49.8.709 · Cited by 2,883 · cited 2×
“One possible interpretation of the individual differences displayed here is in terms of two-process theories of reasoning (Epstein, 1994; Evans, 1984, 1996; Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996).”
BackgroundCacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Feinstein, J. A., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (1996) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.119.2.197 · Cited by 2,517 · cited 1×
“Consistent with this individual differences prediction, Smith and Levin (1996) have found that two different framing effects (one analogous to the Disease Problem) were smaller among individuals higher in need for cognition—a dispositional variable associated with thoughtful analysis, deep reflection, and greater info…”
BackgroundConfirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing
Klayman, J., & Ha, Y.-W. (1987) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.94.2.211 · Cited by 2,094
Cited by
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence
Druckman, J. N. (2001) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1023/a:1015006907312 · Cited by 1,265
Peters, E., Västfjäll, D., Slovic, P., Mertz, C. K., Mazzocco, K., & Dickert, S. (2006) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01720.x · Cited by 1,180
Metadata
- Authors
- E. Stanovich, K., & West, R. F.
- Venue
- Thinking & Reasoning
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 1998-11
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 289-317
- ISSN
- 1354-6783 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0708
- OpenAlex
- W2073609012
- Cited by
- 229
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 1.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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