Mind-making practices: the social infrastructure of self-knowing agency and responsibility
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper is divided into two parts. In Section 1, I explore and defend a “regulative view” of folk-psychology as against the “standard view” (encompassing both theory-theory and simulation theory, as well as hybrid variations). On the regulative view, folk-psychology is conceptualized in fundamentally interpersonal terms as a “mind-making” practice through which we come to form and regulate our minds in accordance with a rich array of socially shared and socially maintained sense-making norms. It is not, as the standard view maintains, simply an epistemic capacity for coming to know about the mental states and dispositions already there. Importantly, the regulative view can meet and beat the standard at its own epistemic game. But it also does more. In Section 2, I show how the regulative view makes progress on two other problems that remain puzzling on the standard view: (1) the problem of “first-person authority” – accounting for the special features of self-knowledge; and (2) the problem of “reactive responsiveness” – accounting for our deep concern with calling one another to account for normatively untoward behaviour, both generally and in the moral domain.
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Cites
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The sense of should: A biologically-based framework for modeling social pressure
Theriault, J. E., Young, L., & Barrett, L. F. (2021) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2020.01.004 · Cited by 201
Psychiatry Beyond the Brain: Externalism, Mental Health, and Autistic Spectrum Disorder
Roberts, T., Krueger, J., & Glackin, S. (2019) · Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology · doi:10.1353/ppp.2019.0030 · Cited by 54
A way forward for responsibility in the age of AI
Gogoshin, D. L. (2025) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2024.2312455 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Authors
- McGeer, V.
- Venue
- Philosophical Explorations
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2015-05-04
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 259-281
- ISSN
- 1386-9795 (ISSN-L)
- 1741-5918
- OpenAlex
- W1750657604
- Cited by
- 144
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 5.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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