The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Finding faults: How moral dilemmas illuminate cognitive structure
Abstract
Philosophy is rife with intractable moral dilemmas. We propose that these debates often exist because competing psychological systems yield different answers to the same problem. Consequently, philosophical debate points to the natural fault lines between dissociable psychological mechanisms, and as such provides a useful guide for cognitive neuroscience. We present two case studies from recent research into moral judgment: dilemmas concerning whether to harm a person in order to save several others, and whether to punish individuals for harms caused accidentally. Finally, we analyze two features of mental conflict that apparently contribute to philosophical discord: the insistence that one answer to a problem must be correct ("non-negotiability") and the absence of an independent means of determining the correct answer ("non-adjudicability"). Fiery Cushman thanks the Mind/Brain/Behavior Initiative for its generous support during the preparation of this work.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.2.127 · Cited by 7,335
Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making
Frederick, S. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005775196732 · Cited by 5,256
Meeting of minds: the medial frontal cortex and social cognition
Amodio, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2006) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn1884 · Cited by 3,782 · cited 2×
“Moreover, medial regions of prefrontal cortex are implicated in a variety of other aspects of social cognition (Amodio & Frith, 2006 ), and so any reverse inference from patterns activation to underlying psychological mechanism must be approached cautiously.”
Separate neural systems value immediate and delayed monetary rewards
McClure, S. M., Laibson, D. I., Loewenstein, G., & Cohen, J. D. (2004) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1100907 · Cited by 3,089
The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027 · Cited by 2,620
Self-citationDamage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05631 · Cited by 1,545
Self-citationCognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004 · Cited by 1,231 · cited 2×
“Likewise, it explains why cognitive load (Greene et al., 2008), individual thinking styles (Bartels, 2008), and”
Self-citationCrime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment
Cushman, F. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006 · Cited by 990
Self-citationThinking the unthinkable: sacred values and taboo cognitions
Tetlock, P. E. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00135-9 · Cited by 915 · cited 2×
“which are characterized by non-negotiability (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Tetlock, 2003).”
A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications
HAUSER, M., CUSHMAN, F., YOUNG, L., KANG‐XING JIN, R., & MIKHAIL, J. (2007) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00297.x · Cited by 666 · cited 1×
“But, most people will endorse diverting the trolley onto a side-track where it will kill one person (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006 ; Greene et al, 2001 ; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007 ; Mikhail, 2000 ).”
Self-citationThe neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment
Young, L., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Saxe, R. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0701408104 · Cited by 625 · cited 1×
“Functional neuroimaging of adults engaging in moral judgment reveals activation of brain regions implicated in cognitive conflict and control for the judgment of accidental harms compared with non-accidental harms (Young et al., 2007).”
BackgroundSelf-citationCurvilinear Motion in the Absence of External Forces: Naïve Beliefs About the Motion of Objects
McCloskey, M., Caramazza, A., & Green, B. (1980) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.210.4474.1139 · Cited by 586
Selective deficit in personal moral judgment following damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex
Ciaramelli, E., Muccioli, M., Làdavas, E., & di Pellegrino, G. (2007) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsm001 · Cited by 436
An Investigation of Moral Judgement in Frontotemporal Dementia
Mendez, M. F., Anderson, E., & Shapira, J. S. (2005) · Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology · doi:10.1097/01.wnn.0000191292.17964.bb · Cited by 360 · cited 2×
“Specifically, individuals with damage to the vmPFC are far more likely than healthy individuals to endorse harmful behavior in order to promote a greater good (Koenigs et al, 2007 ; see also Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Ladavas, & di Pellegrino, 2007 ; Mendez, Anderson, & Shapria, 2005 ).”
Innocent intentions: A correlation between forgiveness for accidental harm and neural activity☆
Young, L., & Saxe, R. (2009) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.03.020 · Cited by 249
The Psychology of Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Morality
Cushman, F., & Young, L. (2009) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-008-9145-3 · Cited by 61 · cited 5×
“Building on several recent proposals (Cushman & Young, 2009; Greene, 2008; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008), we have argued that philosophical dilemmas often arise when two distinct psychological processes yield conflicting answers to a common representational or motivational problem.”
InfluentialSelf-citationAbnormal moral reasoning in complete and partial callosotomy patients
Miller, M. B., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Young, L., King, D., Paggi, A., Fabri, M., Polonara, G., & Gazzaniga, M. S. (2010) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.02.021 · Cited by 54
Cited by
Action, Outcome, and Value: A Dual-System Framework for Morality
Cushman, F. (2013) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868313495594 · Cited by 473
Self-citationThe development of intent-based moral judgment
Cushman, F., Sheketoff, R., Wharton, S., & Carey, S. (2013) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.11.008 · Cited by 396
Self-citationBeyond point-and-shoot morality: why cognitive (neuro)science matters for ethics
Greene, J. D. (2014) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/675875 · Cited by 375
Self-citationThe myth of harmless wrongs in moral cognition: Automatic dyadic completion from sin to suffering.
Gray, K., Schein, C., & Ward, A. F. (2014) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/a0036149 · Cited by 309
The roots of modern justice: cognitive and neural foundations of social norms and their enforcement
Buckholtz, J. W., & Marois, R. (2012) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.3087 · Cited by 286
Metadata
- Authors
- Cushman, F., & Greene, J. D.
- Venue
- Social Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2011-09-23
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 269-279
- ISSN
- 1747-0919 (ISSN-L)
- 1747-0927
- OpenAlex
- W2149583344
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 4.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.