The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Law and Finance
Abstract
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common‐law countries generally have the strongest, and frenchcivillaw countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German‐and scandinavin‐civil‐law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negativelyrelated to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified share‐holders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.
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“LLSV (1998) show that whether a country's Commercial/Company law derives from British, French, German, or Scandinavian legal origins shapes the functioning of financial systems.”
From Finance, Growth, and Inequality (2021) · cites this paper as La Porta et al. (1998)
In the citing paper
“Antidirector rights index 4.00 2.33 2.33 3.00 3.00”
From Investor protection and corporate governance (2000) · cites this paper as La Porta et al. (1998)
In the citing paper
“Creditor rights index 3.11 1.58 2.33 2.00 2.30”
From Investor protection and corporate governance (2000) · cites this paper as La Porta et al. (1998)
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Corporate Ownership Around the World
Porta, R. L., López‐de‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00115 · Cited by 10,567
Self-citationThe colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation
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Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848
Self-citationThe Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply
Acemoğlu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.6.3077 · Cited by 6,050
The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. P. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00067-2 · Cited by 5,754
Metadata
- Authors
- La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- University of Chicago (US)
- ORCID
- Vishny, Robert W.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1998-12
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1113-1155
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W3121759882
- Cited by
- 18,025
- References
- 37
- Citations by year
- 2026: 706 · 2025: 720 · 2024: 614 · 2023: 606 · 2022: 607 · 2021: 665 · 2020: 712 · 2019: 760 · 2018: 754 · 2017: 718 · 2016: 722 · 2015: 773 · 2014: 875 · 2013: 859 · 2012: 927
- FWCI
- 722.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
- Keywords
- investor protection, shareholder rights, creditor protection, common law, civil law, legal origins, rule of law, ownership concentration, corporate governance, cross-national comparison
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