The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The conditions under which transactors can use the market (repeat-purchase) mechanism of contract enforcement are examined. Increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance. A necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance. This will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm-specific assets. Advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance.
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“When buyers trust sellers as a result of an improved perception, they allow sellers to obtain premium prices and yield above-average profits (Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983) to compensate seller transaction risks (Ba and Pavlou 2002).”
From Buyers' trust and mistrust in e-commerce platforms: a synthesizing literature review (2022) · cites this paper as Klein and Leffler 1981
In the citing paper
“A similar idea dominates recent theories of product-quality assurance, in which firms buy inefficient gifts of advertising (Klein and Leffler 1981) or give gifts of high-quality goods sold at low-quality prices (Shapiro 1983) to signal their intention to produce high-quality goods.”
From Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols (1988) · cites this paper as Klein and Leffler 1981
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“1”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1981-08
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 615-641
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2066557547
- Cited by
- 3,653
- References
- 19
- Citations by year
- 2026: 48 · 2025: 56 · 2024: 51 · 2023: 64 · 2022: 76 · 2021: 96 · 2020: 88 · 2019: 108 · 2018: 122 · 2017: 111 · 2016: 126 · 2015: 106 · 2014: 132 · 2013: 120 · 2012: 152
- FWCI
- 62.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- contract enforcement, market forces, contract performance, firm-specific assets, advertising expenditure
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.