The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The conditions under which transactors can use the market (repeat-purchase) mechanism of contract enforcement are examined. Increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance. A necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance. This will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm-specific assets. Advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“When buyers trust sellers as a result of an improved perception, they allow sellers to obtain premium prices and yield above-average profits (Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983) to compensate seller transaction risks (Ba and Pavlou 2002).”
From Buyers' trust and mistrust in e-commerce platforms: a synthesizing literature review (2022) · cites this paper as Klein and Leffler 1981
In the citing paper
“A similar idea dominates recent theories of product-quality assurance, in which firms buy inefficient gifts of advertising (Klein and Leffler 1981) or give gifts of high-quality goods sold at low-quality prices (Shapiro 1983) to signal their intention to produce high-quality goods.”
From Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols (1988) · cites this paper as Klein and Leffler 1981
Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Spence, M. (1973) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882010 · Cited by 19,518
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
Williamson, O. E. (1979) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466942 · Cited by 10,190
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., & Alchian, A. A. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466922 · Cited by 5,791
Self-citationInformation and Consumer Behavior
Nelson, P. (1970) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259630 · Cited by 5,758
Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud
Darby, M. R., & Karni, E. (1973) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466756 · Cited by 3,947
The Theory of Monopolistic Competition
Fouraker, L. E., & Chamberlin, E. H. (1957) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1054428 · Cited by 2,122
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study
Macaulay, S. (2018) · The Sociology of Economic Life · doi:10.4324/9780429494338-12 · Cited by 2,026
Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.
Simon, H. A., Luce, R. D., & Raiffa, H. (1958) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2089260 · Cited by 1,944
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
Becker, G. S., & Stigler, G. J. (1974) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467507 · Cited by 1,843
Cited by
Items 101–200 of 1,004
Chapter 28 The Economic Analysis of Advertising
Bagwell, K. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03028-7 · Cited by 545
Standardization versus Adaptation of International Marketing Strategy: An Empirical Investigation
Szymanski, D. M., Bharadwaj, S. G., & Varadarajan, P. R. (1993) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1177/002224299305700401 · Cited by 565
Information Asymmetry and Levels of Agency Relationships
Mishra, D. P., Heide, J. B., & Cort, S. G. (1998) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1177/002224379803500301 · Cited by 553
Does a Seller's eCommerce Reputation Matter? Evidence from eBay Auctions
Alm, J. R., & Melnik, M. I. (2002) · Issue Lab (Candid) · Cited by 558
An Empirical Look at Franchising as an Organizational Form
Norton, S. W. (1988) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296428 · Cited by 548
Stakeholders' implicit claims and accounting method choice
Bowen, R. M., DuCharme, L., & Shores, D. (1995) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(95)00404-1 · Cited by 555
The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (1993) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.7.1.83 · Cited by 536
Courts and Relational Contracts
Johnson, S. (2002) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/18.1.221 · Cited by 533
Hur, W.-M., Kim, H., & Woo, J. (2014) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-013-1910-0 · Cited by 538
“distinctive from other individual marketing elements (Klein and Leffler 1981).”
BackgroundInvestment Bank Reputation and the Price and Quality of Underwriting Services
FANG, L. H. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00815.x · Cited by 550
WHY HOLD‐UPS OCCUR: THE SELF‐ENFORCING RANGE OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
Klein, B. (1996) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1996.tb01388.x · Cited by 543
Self-citationFinancial Policy and Reputation for Product Quality
Maksimovic, V., & Titman, S. (1991) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/4.1.175 · Cited by 533
“This analysis relates to the Klein and Leffler (1981) argument that a firm may purposely limit the salvage value of its assets in order to commit to producing a high-quality product.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialIyer, G., Soberman, D., & Villas-Boas, J. M. (2005) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1050.0117 · Cited by 518
THE DYNAMICS OF SELLER REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM EBAY*
CABRAL, L., & HORTAÇSU, A. (2010) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00405.x · Cited by 505
“Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983) propose money burning in the form of advertising.”
BackgroundInfluentialBiglaiser, G. (1993) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555758 · Cited by 504
Does Hospital Competition Save Lives? Evidence from the English NHS Patient Choice Reforms
Cooper, Z., Gibbons, S., Jones, S., & McGuire, A. (2011) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02449.x · Cited by 490
“Elsewhere, Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983) and Allen (1984), have found that even in markets with imperfect information, there is likely to be an equilibrium with optimal quality if consumers can perceive quality ex post and providers have an interest in attracting repeat business.”
BackgroundPrices as Signals of Product Quality
Wolinsky, A. (1983) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297767 · Cited by 500
Money Talks: Perceived Advertising Expense and Expected Product Quality
Kirmani, A., & Wright, P. (1989) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/209220 · Cited by 477
What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset
Tadelis, S. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.3.548 · Cited by 461
Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity
Bernheim, B. D., & Whinston, M. D. (1997) · American Economic Review · Cited by 608
An initial classification of supply networks
Lamming, R., Johnsen, T., Zheng, J., & Harland, C. (2000) · International Journal of Operations & Production Management · doi:10.1108/01443570010321667 · Cited by 472
Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
Fudenberg, D., Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1990) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90048-o · Cited by 483
Asset specificity, firm heterogeneity and capital structure
Balakrishnan, S., & Fox, I. (1993) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250140103 · Cited by 474
Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions
Brown, M., Falk, A., & Fehr, E. (2004) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00511.x · Cited by 461
The differential roles of brand credibility and brand prestige in consumer brand choice
Baek, T. H., Kim, J., & Yu, J. H. (2010) · Psychology & Marketing · doi:10.1002/mar.20350 · Cited by 435
“Brand investments represent a firm’s spending on brands in order to demonstrate long-term brand commitment and to assure consumers that brand promises will be kept (Klein & Leffler, 1981).”
BackgroundGovernance Value Analysis and Marketing Strategy
Ghosh, M., & John, G. (1999) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1177/00222429990634s113 · Cited by 460
Corporate suppliers and customers and accounting conservatism
Hui, K. W., Klasa, S., & Yeung, P. E. (2012) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.11.007 · Cited by 458
“Prior studies (e.g., Telser, 1980; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Bull, 1987) propose that when deciding whether to transact with a particular firm or what terms to offer the firm, suppliers and customers place significant importance on the firm’s reputation for honoring stakeholders’ implicit claims.”
Reputation and Product Quality
Allen, F. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555440 · Cited by 465
Amiram, D., Bozanic, Z., Cox, J. D., Dupont, Q., Karpoff, J. M., & Sloan, R. (2018) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-017-9435-x · Cited by 422
“For example, Klein and Leffler (1981) examine theoretically the conditions under which reputational investments will not arise to assure performance quality.”
Johnson, W. B., & Lys, T. (1990) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(90)90051-5 · Cited by 447
Auditor Changes: A Joint Test of Theories Relating to Agency Costs and Auditor Differentiation
Francis, J. R., & Wilson, E. R. (2016) · Cited by 438
The reputational penalty firms bear from committing criminal fraud
Karpoff, J. M., & Lott, J. R. (1996) · The Economics of Organised Crime · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511751882.018 · Cited by 434
The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship
Wintrobe, R. (1990) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962769 · Cited by 430
WHY FIRMS SEEK ISO 9000 CERTIFICATION: REGULATORY COMPLIANCE OR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE?
Anderson, S. W., Daly, J. D., & Johnson, M. F. (1999) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/j.1937-5956.1999.tb00059.x · Cited by 426
Dennis, S. A., & Mullineaux, D. J. (2000) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1006/jfin.2000.0298 · Cited by 402
Ryall, M. D., & Sampson, R. C. (2009) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1090.0995 · Cited by 418
Corporate Image: Employee Reactions and Implications for Managing Corporate Social Performance
Riordan, C. M., Gatewood, R. D., & Bill, J. B. (1997) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1023/a:1017989205184 · Cited by 388
The impact of interface usability on trust in Web retailers
Christine Roy, M., Dewit, O., & Aubert, B. A. (2001) · Internet Research · doi:10.1108/10662240110410165 · Cited by 394
Endogenous Communication Among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives
Padilla, A. J., & Pagano, M. (1997) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/10.1.205 · Cited by 409
The Use of Quality and Reputation Indicators by Consumers: The Case of Bordeaux Wine
Landon, S., & Smith, C. E. (1997) · Journal of Consumer Policy · doi:10.1023/a:1006830218392 · Cited by 401
Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation
McChesney, F. S. (1988) · The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking · doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_15 · Cited by 397
When It Pays to Pay Your Investment Banker: New Evidence on the Role of Financial Advisors in M&As
GOLUBOV, A., PETMEZAS, D., & TRAVLOS, N. G. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01712.x · Cited by 381
Narcissism, Identity, and Legitimacy
Brown, A. D. (1997) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259409 · Cited by 379
Joshi, A. W., & Stump, R. L. (1999) · Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science · doi:10.1177/0092070399273001 · Cited by 390
List, J. A. (2006) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/498587 · Cited by 392
The use of eco‐labels: a review of the literature
Galarraga Gallastegui, I. (2002) · European Environment · doi:10.1002/eet.304 · Cited by 355
Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement
MacLeod, W. B. (2007) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.45.3.595 · Cited by 384
Limited Access Orders In The Developing World :A New Approach To The Problems Of Development
North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., Webb, S. B., & Weingast, B. R. (2007) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-4359 · Cited by 372
“(2003) and Grossman and Helpman (2001). iv Klein and Leffler (1981) make a similar argument in the context of rents and commitment to assure contractual performance. v.Notice that this view of rent-creation differs from the more well-known approach to rent-seeking (e.g., Buchanan, Tollison and…”
What Makes Consumers Willing to Pay a Price Premium for National Brands over Private Labels?
Steenkamp, J.-B. E. M., Van Heerde, H. J., & Geyskens, I. (2010) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmkr.47.6.1011 · Cited by 361
Does Auditor Reputation Matter? The Case of KPMG Germany and ComROAD AG
WEBER, J., WILLENBORG, M., & ZHANG, J. (2008) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2008.00298.x · Cited by 389
The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms
Friedman, E. J., & Resnick, P. (2001) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1162/105864001300122476 · Cited by 377
Commitment to social good and insider trading
Gao, F., Lisic, L. L., & Zhang, I. X. (2014) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.03.001 · Cited by 375
“We thus expect a firm's socially responsible image to constrain profitable insider trading, consistent with reputation being an informal enforcement mechanism against opportunism as predicted in the economic literature (e.g., Klein and Leffler, 1981).”
Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols
Camerer, C. (1988) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/228946 · Cited by 372
Economic Foundations of Strategy
Mahoney, J. (2005) · Sage eBooks · doi:10.4135/9781452229850 · Cited by 367
Behl, A., Kumari, P. S. R., Makhija, H., & Sharma, D. (2022) · Annals of Operations Research · doi:10.1007/s10479-021-04189-8 · Cited by 270
Blair, R. D., & Lafontaine, F. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511753879 · Cited by 364
Determinants of Electronic Integration in the Insurance Industry: An Empirical Test
Zaheer, A., & Venkatraman, N. (1994) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.40.5.549 · Cited by 363
Williams, M. (2007) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2007.24351867 · Cited by 341
“This emotionally costly signaling process operates in a manner similar to processes noted by Klein and Leffler (1981), in which a seller’s investments in expensive advertising can lead buyers to believe that producing and selling a high-quality product is the only way for the seller to recoup…”
MethodKroszner, R. S., & Stratmann, T. (1996) · American Economic Review · Cited by 409
Consumer and Market Drivers of the Trial Probability of New Consumer Packaged Goods
Steenkamp, J.-B. E. M., & Gielens, K. (2003) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/378615 · Cited by 346
Medicare upcoding and hospital ownership
Silverman, E., & Skinner, J. (2004) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2003.09.007 · Cited by 350
“On the other hand, we would expect for-profit hospital chains with brand-name capital, in the sense of Klein and Leffler (1981), to face greater reputational penalties from detection.”
BackgroundGilley, K. M., Worrell, D. L., Davidson, W. N., & El–Jelly, A. (2000) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1016/s0149-2063(00)00079-9 · Cited by 343
Corporate Philanthropy, Criminal Activity, and Firm Reputation: Is There a Link?
Williams, R. J., & Barrett, J. D. (2000) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1023/a:1006282312238 · Cited by 343
The selection principle and market failure in systems competition
Sinn, H.-W. (1997) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(97)00043-1 · Cited by 362
The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime
Bonnitcha, J., Skovgaard Poulsen, L. N., & Waibel, M. (2017) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/law/9780198719540.001.0001 · Cited by 345
The Effect of Prior Knowledge on Price Acceptability and the Type of Information Examined
Rao, A. R., & Sieben, W. A. (1992) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/209300 · Cited by 340
Tax Aggressiveness and Accounting Fraud
LENNOX, C., LISOWSKY, P., & PITTMAN, J. (2013) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/joar.12002 · Cited by 320
Marketing Strategy and the Internet: An Organizing Framework
Varadarajan, P. R., & Yadav, M. S. (2002) · Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science · doi:10.1177/009207002236907 · Cited by 329
Dwivedi, A., Nayeem, T., & Murshed, F. (2018) · Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services · doi:10.1016/j.jretconser.2018.06.009 · Cited by 277
Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms
Klein, B., & Murphy, K. M. (1988) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467157 · Cited by 346
Self-citationGlobal Brand Purchase Likelihood: A Critical Synthesis and an Integrated Conceptual Framework
Özsomer, A., & Altaras, S. (2008) · Journal of International Marketing · doi:10.1509/jimk.16.4.1 · Cited by 328
Höner, J. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260136444 · Cited by 337
The Strategic Role of Product Quality
Jacobson, R., & Aaker, D. A. (1987) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1177/002224298705100404 · Cited by 323
Internet shopping, consumer search and product branding
Ward, M. R., & Lee, M. J. (2000) · Journal of Product & Brand Management · doi:10.1108/10610420010316302 · Cited by 330
Reputation Repair After a Serious Restatement
Chakravarthy, J., deHaan, E., & Rajgopal, S. (2014) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-50716 · Cited by 339
Kalt, J. P., & Zupan, M. A. (1990) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467201 · Cited by 340
Ratings quality over the business cycle
Bar-Isaac, H., & Shapiro, J. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.11.004 · Cited by 297
Beyond the Washington consensus: Institutions matter
Burki, S. J., & Perry, G. E. (1998) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/0-8213-4282-7 · Cited by 323
Quality Expectations, Reputation, and Price
Landon, S., & Smith, C. (1998) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.1002/j.2325-8012.1998.tb00084.x · Cited by 401
Tiebreaker: Certification and Multiple Credit Ratings
BONGAERTS, D., CREMERS, K. J. M., & GOETZMANN, W. N. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01709.x · Cited by 331
Price, quality, and reputation: evidence from an online field experiment
Jin, G. Z., & Kato, A. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00067.x · Cited by 326
“1 In a slightly different setting, Klein and Leffler (1981) argued that high price in the company of high quality generates a continual stream of rental income, which motivates sellers to provide high quality in the long run rather than cheat and disappear in the short run.”
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy
(1986) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036906 · Cited by 320
Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length
Crocker, K. J., & Masten, S. E. (1988) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555660 · Cited by 329
Transaction Cost Economics As a Theory of Supply Chain Efficiency
Ketokivi, M., & Mahoney, J. T. (2020) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/poms.13148 · Cited by 278
“…maintaining an ongoing relationship is in the economic interest of the exchange parties, and the discounted value of anticipated future transaction outweighs the economic benefit of a one-time opportunistic act that runs the risk of terminating the exchange relationship (Klein and Leffler 1981).”
BackgroundExternal Auditors, Audit Committees and Earnings Management in France
Piot, C., & Janin, R. (2007) · European Accounting Review · doi:10.1080/09638180701391030 · Cited by 296
“The quality of the external audit, unobservable to the public, is commonly proxied by auditor size or reputation (DeAngelo, 1981; Klein and Leffler, 1981), or by the length of the auditor–client relationship (Knapp, 1991).”
BackgroundManagement Turnover and Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud
Agrawal, A., Jaffe, J. F., & Karpoff, J. M. (1999) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467427 · Cited by 314
Competition and Quality in Health Care Markets
Gaynor, M. (2006) · Foundations and Trends® in Microeconomics · doi:10.1561/0700000024 · Cited by 343
“A number of papers have considered the question of whether there is an equilibrium at which the socially optimal quality is produced in a market where consumers are imperfectly informed about quality (but not about price) (Allen, 1984, Klein and Leffler, 1981, Shapiro, 1983).”
BackgroundCompetition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services
Wolinsky, A. (1993) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555964 · Cited by 308
Ba, S., & Pavlou, P. A. (2002) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/4132332 · Cited by 312
“The economics literature defines price premiums as prices that yield above-average profits (Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983).”
BackgroundGeographical Indications and the Competitive Provision of Quality in Agricultural Markets
Moschini, G., Menapace, L., & Pick, D. (2008) · American Journal of Agricultural Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01142.x · Cited by 291
“One possible solution has emphasized the role of firms’ reputation as conveyed by their brands (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983).”
Contextual Factors Surrounding Reputation Damage With Potential Implications for Reputation Repair
Rhee, M., & Valdez, M. E. (2009) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2009.35713324 · Cited by 295
Building a family firm image: How family firms capitalize on their family ties
Zellweger, T. M., Kellermanns, F. W., Eddleston, K. A., & Memili, E. (2012) · Journal of Family Business Strategy · doi:10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.10.001 · Cited by 288
“A positive organizational reputation can be a source of competitive advantage that allows a firm to charge premium prices (e.g., Klein & Leffler, 1981), attract new clients (Fombrun, 1996), enhance access to capital markets (Beatty & Ritter, 1986) and sustain market share during industry downturns…”
BackgroundDo Innovations Really Pay Off? Total Stock Market Returns to Innovation
Sood, A., & Tellis, G. J. (2009) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1080.0407 · Cited by 294
Transaction costs as determinants of opportunism in integrated and independent sales forces
Anderson, E. (1988) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(88)90036-4 · Cited by 304
Factors affecting investment bank initial public offering market share
Dunbar, C. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00043-4 · Cited by 315
“There is considerable evidence that investment bank reputation has a significant effect on the pricing and long-run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs).1 Less is known regarding how reputation is developed or destroyed.”
BackgroundDoes corporate social responsibility create shareholder value? The importance of long-term investors
Nguyen, P.-A., Kecskés, A., & Mansi, S. (2020) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.09.013 · Cited by 286
The equalization price: A measure of consumer-perceived brand equity
Swait́, J., Erdem, T., Louviere, J., & Dubelaar, C. (1993) · International Journal of Research in Marketing · doi:10.1016/0167-8116(93)90031-s · Cited by 293
Information asymmetries: A source of competitive advantage for diversified service firms
Nayyar, P. R. (1990) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250110703 · Cited by 301
The Influence of Product Variety on Brand Perception and Choice
Berger, J., Draganska, M., & Simonson, I. (2007) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1060.0253 · Cited by 290
“The notion that consumers rely on cues to assess quality is well established and has been relied on in both marketing (e.g., Allison and Uhl 1964, Olson 1977, Mayzlin 2006, Purohit and Srivastava 2001) and economics (e.g., Klein and Leffler 1981, Nelson 1974).”
BackgroundExplicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The Legal Logic to the Japanese Main Bank System
Ramseyer, J. M. (1995) · The Japanese Main Bank System · doi:10.1093/0198288999.003.0007 · Cited by 322
Metadata
- Authors
- Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1981-08
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 615-641
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2066557547
- Cited by
- 3,653
- References
- 19
- Citations by year
- 2026: 48 · 2025: 56 · 2024: 51 · 2023: 64 · 2022: 76 · 2021: 96 · 2020: 88 · 2019: 108 · 2018: 122 · 2017: 111 · 2016: 126 · 2015: 106 · 2014: 132 · 2013: 120 · 2012: 152
- FWCI
- 62.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- contract enforcement, market forces, contract performance, firm-specific assets, advertising expenditure
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.