The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The conditions under which transactors can use the market (repeat-purchase) mechanism of contract enforcement are examined. Increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance. A necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance. This will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm-specific assets. Advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance.
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“When buyers trust sellers as a result of an improved perception, they allow sellers to obtain premium prices and yield above-average profits (Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983) to compensate seller transaction risks (Ba and Pavlou 2002).”
From Buyers' trust and mistrust in e-commerce platforms: a synthesizing literature review (2022) · cites this paper as Klein and Leffler 1981
In the citing paper
“A similar idea dominates recent theories of product-quality assurance, in which firms buy inefficient gifts of advertising (Klein and Leffler 1981) or give gifts of high-quality goods sold at low-quality prices (Shapiro 1983) to signal their intention to produce high-quality goods.”
From Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols (1988) · cites this paper as Klein and Leffler 1981
Citations
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Helland, E. (2006) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/505371 · Cited by 198
Middlemen as guarantors of quality
Biglaiser, G., & Friedman, J. W. (1994) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-7187(94)90005-1 · Cited by 180
Wang, E. T. G. (2002) · Information Systems Journal · doi:10.1046/j.1365-2575.2002.00120.x · Cited by 186
“In addition to the three basic dimensions of transactions, transactor reputation has often been related to the transaction cost reasoning because of its ability to limit opportunism and to assure contractual performance (Klein & Leffler, 1981; Joskow, 1985; Klein, 1988).”
BackgroundOrder with Some Law: Complementarity versus Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements
Lazzarini, S. G. (2004) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewh034 · Cited by 191
The Problem of Search and Deliberation in Economic Action: When Social Networks Really Matter
Rangan, S. (2000) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259208 · Cited by 190
Houston, M. B., & Johnson, S. A. (2000) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmkr.37.1.1.18719 · Cited by 186
“Instead, the buyer is confident that the supplier will refrain from opportunism out of desire to protect an asset, its hardearned reputation, from costly damage (Das and Teng 1998; Klein and Leffler 1981).”
BackgroundQuality certification by geographical indications, trademarks and firm reputation
Menapace, L., & Moschini, G. (2012) · European Review of Agricultural Economics · doi:10.1093/erae/jbr053 · Cited by 167
“This notion is due to the seminal treatment of Klein and Leffler (1981), with Shapiro (1983) providing an earlier insightful modeling structure.”
BackgroundMethod
Metadata
- Authors
- Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1981-08
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 615-641
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2066557547
- Cited by
- 3,653
- References
- 19
- Citations by year
- 2026: 48 · 2025: 56 · 2024: 51 · 2023: 64 · 2022: 76 · 2021: 96 · 2020: 88 · 2019: 108 · 2018: 122 · 2017: 111 · 2016: 126 · 2015: 106 · 2014: 132 · 2013: 120 · 2012: 152
- FWCI
- 62.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- contract enforcement, market forces, contract performance, firm-specific assets, advertising expenditure
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.