The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collective Labor Supply and Welfare
Abstract
The paper develops a general, "collective" model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own (possibly altruistic) preferences, and household decisions are only assumed to be Pareto efficient. An alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal decision process: agents first share nonlabor income, according to some given sharing rule; then each one optimally chooses his or her own labor supply and consumption. This setting is shown to generate testable restrictions on labor supplies. Moreover, the observation of labor supply behavior is sufficient for recovering individual preferences and the sharing rule (up to a constant). Finally, the traditional tools of welfare analysis can be adapted to the new setting.
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Citations
Cites
Becker, G. S. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260084 · Cited by 3,484
(2020) · Radical Treatment · doi:10.2307/j.ctvw1d7dg.9 · Cited by 3,373
Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis
Manser, M., & Brown, M. (1980) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2526238 · Cited by 1,972
Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand
McElroy, M. B., & Horney, M. J. (1981) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2526280 · Cited by 1,905
Popper, K. R., & Hudson, G. E. (1963) · Physics Today · doi:10.1063/1.3050617 · Cited by 1,071
The Empirical Content of Nash-Bargained Household Behavior
McElroy, M. B. (1990) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/145667 · Cited by 683
Demographic Variables in Demand Analysis
Pollak, R. A., & Wales, T. J. (1981) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911416 · Cited by 585
How Serious is the Neglect of Intra-Household Inequality?
Haddad, L., & Kanbur, R. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233663 · Cited by 546
Collective models of household behavior
Bourguignon, F., & Chiappori, P.-A. (1992) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(92)90091-a · Cited by 275
Self-citationDeaton, A. S., Ruiz-Castillo, J., & Thomas, D. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261597 · Cited by 244
The Distribution of Income and Expenditure within the Household
Thomas, D. (1992) · Econstor (Econstor) · Cited by 158
Allocation of income within the household
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-3365 · Cited by 139
Cited by
The Handbook of Economic Sociology
Fukuyama, F., Smelser, N. J., & Swedberg, R. (1994) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20046937 · Cited by 2,096
''Bargaining'' and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household
Agarwal, B. (1997) · Feminist Economics · doi:10.1080/135457097338799 · Cited by 1,693
Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old-Age Pensions and Intrahousehold Allocation in South Africa
Duflo, E. (2003) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/lhg013 · Cited by 1,583
Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household
Udry, C. (1996) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262050 · Cited by 1,261
Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage
Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. A. (1996) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.10.4.139 · Cited by 1,205
Metadata
- Authors
- Chiappori, P.-A.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1992-06
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 437-467
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2081883533
- Cited by
- 1,811
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 22.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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