The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Two-Sided Uncertainty and "Up-or-Out" Contracts
Abstract
A bilateral moral-hazard problem provides a rationale for "up-or-out" employment contracts. The employer sets a wage higher than opportunity cost to induce the worker to invest in firm-specific capital. If the individual does not make the grade, it is in the firm's interest ex post to fire him. Had the initial arrangement not included provisions for firing individuals, the firm would underreport the value of the employee, wrecking the incentive scheme. The basic model permits both firm and worker to be risk neutral. Therefore, it admits a straightforward multiperiod extension, which we also investigate.
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Citations
Cites
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device
Shapiro, C., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1986) · Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511559594.004 · Cited by 4,652
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A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues
BARON, D. P. (1982) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03591.x · Cited by 929
Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets
Malcomson, J. M. (1986) · Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511559594.011 · Cited by 335
The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand
Hall, R. E., & Lazear, E. P. (1984) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298032 · Cited by 212
Green, J., & Kahn, C. M. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885379 · Cited by 143
Self-citationLimited Contract Enforcement and Strategic Renegotiation
Huberman, G., & Kahn, C. M. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 106
Self-citationInvoluntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts
Chari, V. V. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885376 · Cited by 91
Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information and Bilateral Contracts
Riordan, M. H. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297706 · Cited by 46
Involuntary Unemployment and Worker Moral Hazard
Mookherjee, D. (1986) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297717 · Cited by 37
Cited by
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
Baker, G., Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753399445 · Cited by 1,730
Gibbons, R. (1998) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.12.4.115 · Cited by 1,022
The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530152466241 · Cited by 526
A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms
Gibbons, R., & Waldman, M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556287 · Cited by 460
Metadata
- Authors
- Kahn, C., & Huberman, G.
- Venue
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1988-10
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 423-444
- ISSN
- 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5307
- OpenAlex
- W2003560338
- Cited by
- 265
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 2.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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