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Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market
Abstract
We use a unique data set of annuities in the United Kingdom to test for adverse selection. We find systematic relationships between ex post mortality and annuity characteristics, such as the timing of payments and the possibility of payments to the annuitant's estate. These patterns are consistent with the presence of asymmetric information. However, we find no evidence of substantive mortality differences by annuity size. These results suggest that the absence of selection on one contract dimension does not preclude its presence on others. This highlights the importance of considering detailed features of insurance contracts when testing theoretical models of asymmetric information.
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Cites
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Self-citationSources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market
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Optimal choice of health and retirement in a life-cycle model
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Does affirmative action lead to mismatch? A new test and evidence
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Metadata
- Authors
- Finkelstein, A., & Poterba, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2004-02
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 183-208
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2224876874
- Cited by
- 650
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 99.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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