The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation, and Investment Decisions
Open accessAbstract
The credit derivatives market provides a liquid but opaque forum for secondary market trading of banking assets. I show that when entrepreneurs rely upon the certification value of bank debt to obtain cheap bond market finance, the existence of a credit derivatives market may cause them to issue sub-investment grade bonds instead, and to engage in second-best behaviour. Credit derivatives can therefore cause disintermediation and thus reduce welfare. I argue that this effect can be most effectively countered by the introduction of reporting requirements for credit derivatives.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's‐Length Debt
RAJAN, R. G. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04662.x · Cited by 3,902
Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector
Holmstrom, B., & Tirole, J. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555316 · Cited by 3,889
Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt
Diamond, D. W. (1991) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261775 · Cited by 3,331
Fama, E. F. (1985) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(85)90051-0 · Cited by 2,342
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
Laffont, J.-J., & Martimort, D. (2002) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400829453 · Cited by 2,106
Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans
James, C. (1987) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(87)90003-1 · Cited by 1,610
Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors
Bolton, P., & Scharfstein, D. S. (1996) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262015 · Cited by 1,433
Myers, S. C., & Rajan, R. G. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555739 · Cited by 959
Froot, K. A., & Stein, J. C. (1998) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00037-8 · Cited by 857
Further evidence on the bank lending process and the capital market response to bank loan agreements
Lummer, S. L., & McConnell, J. J. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90098-6 · Cited by 856
New issues in corporate finance
Mayer, C. (1988) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(88)90077-3 · Cited by 716
Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Pauly, M. V. (1974) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881793 · Cited by 707
Bolton, P., & Freixas, X. (2000) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262121 · Cited by 677
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (1997) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/10.3.693 · Cited by 604
Banks and loan sales Marketing nonmarketable assets
Gorton, G. B., & Pennacchi, G. G. (1995) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(95)01199-x · Cited by 604
Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring
von Thadden, E.-L. (1995) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298077 · Cited by 573
Proprietary Information, Financial Intermediation, and Research Incentives
Bhattacharya, S., & Chiesa, G. (1995) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1006/jfin.1995.1014 · Cited by 538
Information Production, Market Signalling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation
CAMPBEL, T. S., & KRACAW, W. A. (1980) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb03506.x · Cited by 527
Bernheim, B. D., & Whinston, M. D. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912844 · Cited by 458
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938317 · Cited by 410
Debt covenants and renegotiation
Berlin, M., & Mester, L. J. (1992) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/1042-9573(92)90005-x · Cited by 393
Banking, financial intermediation and corporate finance
Hellwig, M. (1991) · European Financial Integration · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511752070.006 · Cited by 324
Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and Moral Hazard
Besanko, D., & Kanatas, G. (1993) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/6.1.213 · Cited by 313
How Do Firms Choose Their Lenders? An Empirical Investigation
Cantillo, M., & Wright, J. (2000) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/13.1.155 · Cited by 306
Datta, S., Iskandar-Datta, M., & Patel, A. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00060-9 · Cited by 283
The Design of Bank Loan Contracts
Gorton, G., & Kahn, J. (2000) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/13.2.331 · Cited by 249
Froot, K., & Stein, J. (1996) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5403 · Cited by 244
Banks and Loan Sales: Marketing Non-Marketable Assets
Gorton, G., & Pennacchi, G. (1990) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3551 · Cited by 227
Information Production, Market Signalling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation
Campbell, T. S., & Kracaw, W. A. (1980) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2327206 · Cited by 183
Cited by
Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis
Piskorski, T., Seru, A., & Vig, V. (2010) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.04.003 · Cited by 451
Credit risk transfer and contagion
Allen, F., & Carletti, E. (2006) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.10.004 · Cited by 377
Has the CDS market lowered the cost of corporate debt?
Ashcraft, A. B., & Santos, J. A. C. (2009) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2009.03.008 · Cited by 326
Housing Price Booms and Crowding-Out Effects in Bank Lending
Chakraborty, I., Goldstein, I., & MacKinlay, A. (2018) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhy033 · Cited by 254
Derivatives holdings and market values of U.S. bank holding companies
Choi, W. W., Kim, J., & Kim, M. (2016) · Applied Economics · doi:10.1080/00036846.2016.1164822 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Morrison, A. D.
- Venue
- The Journal of Business
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2005-03
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 621-648
- ISSN
- 0021-9398 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5374
- OpenAlex
- W3122314271
- Cited by
- 288
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 23.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.