The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kalt, J. P., & Zupan, M. A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Law and Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1990-04
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 103-131
- ISSN
- 0022-2186 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5285
- OpenAlex
- W2035947598
- Cited by
- 340
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 142.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.