The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Modes of Communication
Abstract
The paper develops a theory of costly communication in which the sender’s and receiver’s motivations and abilities endogenously determine the communication mode and the transfer of knowledge. Communication is modeled as a problem of moral hazard in teams, in which the sender and receiver select persuasion and message elaboration efforts. The model is shown to provide a rich set of insights concerning (i) the impact of incentive alignment on communication strategies, (ii) the relative influence and the complementarity/substitutability between issue‐relevant communication and cues (information that relates to the credibility of the sender rather than to the issue at stake), and (iii) the path dependency of communication.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dewatripont, M., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2005-12
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1217-1238
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2143068265
- Cited by
- 271
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 18.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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