The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats
Abstract
Many individuals are motivated to exert effort because they care about their jobs, rather than because there are monetary consequences to their actions. The intrinsic motivation of bureaucrats is the focus of this paper, and three primary results are shown. First, bureaucrats should be biased. Second, sometimes this bias takes the form of advocating for their clients more than would their principal, while in other cases, they are more hostile to their interests. For a range of bureaucracies, those who are biased against clients lead to more efficient outcomes. Third, self-selection need not produce the desired bias. Instead, selection to bureaucracies is likely to be bifurcated, in the sense that it becomes composed of those who are most preferred by the principal, and those who are least preferred. (JEL D64, D73, D82)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they do it
(1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.27-4796 · Cited by 3,795
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Self-citationFormal and Real Authority in Organizations
Aghion, P., & Tirole, J. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262063 · Cited by 3,046
Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2001) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00150 · Cited by 3,011
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913
Identity and the Economics of Organizations
Akerlof, G. A., & Kranton, R. E. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330053147930 · Cited by 1,676
Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents
Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201413 · Cited by 1,389
Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review
Dixit, A. (2002) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/3069614 · Cited by 1,104
Mor Barak, M. E., Nissly, J. A., & Levin, A. (2001) · Social Service Review · doi:10.1086/323166 · Cited by 1,005
Justice without trial: Law enforcement in democratic society
(1975) · Journal of Criminal Justice · doi:10.1016/0047-2352(75)90026-4 · Cited by 998
Cited by
The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development
Xu, C. (2011) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.49.4.1076 · Cited by 2,623
Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice
Dranove, D., & Jin, G. Z. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.4.935 · Cited by 740
Behavioral Economics and Psychology of Incentives
Kamenica, E. (2012) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080511-110909 · Cited by 342
Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector
Delfgaauw, J., & Dur, R. (2008) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02108.x · Cited by 336
Determinants of job satisfaction: a European comparison of self-employed and paid employees
Millán, J. M., Hessels, J., Thurik, R., & Aguado, R. (2013) · Small Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11187-011-9380-1 · Cited by 329
Metadata
- Authors
- Prendergast, C.
- Venue
- The American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2007-03-01
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 180-196
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2056756788
- Cited by
- 492
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 46.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/000282807780323532
- The paper
- Prendergast, C. (2007). The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats. The American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282807780323532
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.