The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq
Open accessAbstract
We develop and test an economic theory of insurgency motivated by the informal literature and by recent military doctrine. We model a three-way contest between violent rebels, a government seeking to minimize violence by mixing service provision and coercion, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents. We test the model using panel data from Iraq on violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces, reconstruction spending, and community characteristics (sectarian status, socioeconomic grievances, and natural resource endowments). Our results support the theory’s predictions: improved service provision reduces insurgent violence, particularly for smaller projects and since the “surge” began in 2007.
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Cites
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Cited by
Quantifying the influence of climate on human conflict
Hsiang, S. M., Burke, M., & Miguel, E. (2013) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1235367 · Cited by 1,827
Burke, M., Hsiang, S. M., & Miguel, E. (2015) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115430 · Cited by 655
“Furthermore, there is some evidence that positive income shocks reduce the likelihood of certain types of conflict (Berman et al. 2011b, Iyengar et al. 2011, Dube&Vargas 2013), although there are also findings that suggest a limited or opposite effect of income on conflict risk (Berman et al.…”
BackgroundStates, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders
Staniland, P. (2012) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592712000655 · Cited by 544
Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan
LYALL, J., BLAIR, G., & IMAI, K. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055413000403 · Cited by 527
Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A. M., & Tierney, M. J. (2018) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqx052 · Cited by 410
Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict
Crost, B., Felter, J., & Johnston, P. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.6.1833 · Cited by 399
Self-citationCivil War as State-Making: Strategic Governance in Civil War
Stewart, M. A. (2018) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818317000418 · Cited by 399
Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs
DE MESQUITA, E. B. (2010) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000274 · Cited by 304
Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage
Condra, L. N., & Shapiro, J. N. (2012) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00542.x · Cited by 297
Self-citationA Closer Look at Reporting Bias in Conflict Event Data
Weidmann, N. B. (2016) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12196 · Cited by 294
Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?
Biddle, S., Friedman, J. A., & Shapiro, J. N. (2012) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec_a_00087 · Cited by 276
Self-citationBlattman, C., & Ralston, L. (2015) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2622220 · Cited by 187
What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness? Evidence from the U.S. Drone War in Pakistan
Mir, A. (2018) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec_a_00331 · Cited by 109
Climate change, agricultural production and civil conflict: evidence from the Philippines
Crost, B., Duquennois, C., Felter, J. H., & Rees, D. I. (2018) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2018.01.005 · Cited by 91
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Metadata
- Authors
- Berman, E., Shapiro, J. N., & Felter, J. H.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2011-08
- Volume
- 119
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 766-819
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2891952862
- Cited by
- 694
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 240.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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