The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale: Intuition and Attunement
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Intuition—spontaneous, nondeliberative assessment—has long been indispensable in theoretical and practical philosophy alike. Recent research by psychologists and experimental philosophers has challenged our understanding of the nature and authority of moral intuitions by tracing them to “fast,” “automatic,” “button-pushing” responses of the affective system. This view of the affective system contrasts with a growing body of research in affective neuroscience which suggests that it is instead a flexible learning system that generates and updates a multidimensional evaluative landscape to guide decision and action. With this latter view in mind, I revisit some of the classic hypothetical scenarios used in experimental moral psychology.
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Cited by
Cushman, F. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x19001730 · Cited by 260
The sense of should: A biologically-based framework for modeling social pressure
Theriault, J. E., Young, L., & Barrett, L. F. (2021) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2020.01.004 · Cited by 201
Sauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
SELF-REGULATION AND KNOWLEDGE HOW
Elzinga, B. (2018) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2016.45 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Railton, P.
- Venue
- Ethics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2014-07
- Volume
- 124
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 813-859
- ISSN
- 0014-1704 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-297X
- OpenAlex
- W1995987013
- Cited by
- 228
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 5.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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