The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale: Intuition and Attunement
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Intuition—spontaneous, nondeliberative assessment—has long been indispensable in theoretical and practical philosophy alike. Recent research by psychologists and experimental philosophers has challenged our understanding of the nature and authority of moral intuitions by tracing them to “fast,” “automatic,” “button-pushing” responses of the affective system. This view of the affective system contrasts with a growing body of research in affective neuroscience which suggests that it is instead a flexible learning system that generates and updates a multidimensional evaluative landscape to guide decision and action. With this latter view in mind, I revisit some of the classic hypothetical scenarios used in experimental moral psychology.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.3.231 · Cited by 11,317
A neural substrate of prediction and reward
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., & Montague, P. R. (1997) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.275.5306.1593 · Cited by 9,388
Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences.
Zajonc, R. B. (1980) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.35.2.151 · Cited by 8,094
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.45.3.513 · Cited by 4,952
The unbearable automaticity of being
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.54.7.462 · Cited by 3,699
Deciding advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. R. (1997) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.275.5304.1293 · Cited by 3,547
Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4635.001.0001 · Cited by 3,428
(2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511803475 · Cited by 2,987
Buckner, R. L., & Carroll, D. C. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.004 · Cited by 2,691
Getting formal with dopamine and reward
Schultz, W. (2002) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/s0896-6273(02)00967-4 · Cited by 2,574
On the relationship between emotion and cognition
Pessoa, L. (2008) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2317 · Cited by 2,350
Learning the value of information in an uncertain world
Behrens, T. E. J., Woolrich, M. W., Walton, M. E., & Rushworth, M. F. S. (2007) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn1954 · Cited by 2,053
How (and where) does moral judgment work?
Greene, J., & Haidt, J. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)02011-9 · Cited by 1,945
Coordinated memory replay in the visual cortex and hippocampus during sleep
Ji, D., & Wilson, M. A. (2007) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn1825 · Cited by 1,669
Blair, R. J. R. (2005) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.06.004 · Cited by 1,365
A common role of insula in feelings, empathy and uncertainty
Singer, T., Critchley, H. D., & Preuschoff, K. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.05.001 · Cited by 1,270
Effect of subjective perspective taking during simulation of action: a PET investigation of agency
Ruby, P., & Decety, J. (2001) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/87510 · Cited by 1,182
The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice
Blair, I. V. (2002) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0603_8 · Cited by 1,152
Neural ensembles in CA3 transiently encode paths forward of the animal at a decision point
Johnson, A., & Redish, A. D. (2007) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.3761-07.2007 · Cited by 1,003
Mood as information: 20 years later.
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (2003) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2003.9682896 · Cited by 907
Disgust: evolved function and structure
Tybur, J. M., Lieberman, D., Kurzban, R., & DeScioli, P. (2013) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0030778 · Cited by 810
Value, pleasure and choice in the ventral prefrontal cortex
Grabenhorst, F., & Rolls, E. T. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.12.004 · Cited by 766
Hippocampal replay is not a simple function of experience
Gupta, A. S., van der Meer, M. A. A., Touretzky, D. S., & Redish, A. D. (2010) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.01.034 · Cited by 733
Navigating Into the Future or Driven by the Past
Seligman, M. E. P., Railton, P., Baumeister, R. F., & Sripada, C. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612474317 · Cited by 720
Self-citationNeural differentiation of expected reward and risk in human subcortical structures
Preuschoff, K., Bossaerts, P., & Quartz, S. R. (2006) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2006.06.024 · Cited by 692
Dopamine signals for reward value and risk: basic and recent data
Schultz, W. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Functions · doi:10.1186/1744-9081-6-24 · Cited by 653
The contribution of emotion and cognition to moral sensitivity: A neurodevelopmental study
Decety, J., Michalska, K. J., & Kinzler, K. D. (2012) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhr111 · Cited by 482
Reward Value Coding Distinct From Risk Attitude-Related Uncertainty Coding in Human Reward Systems
Tobler, P. N., O'Doherty, J. P., Dolan, R. J., & Schultz, W. (2007) · Journal of Neurophysiology · doi:10.1152/jn.00745.2006 · Cited by 472
Disgust sensitivity predicts intuitive disapproval of gays
Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., Knobe, J., & Bloom, P. (2009) · Emotion · doi:10.1037/a0015960 · Cited by 466
An Investigation of Moral Judgement in Frontotemporal Dementia
Mendez, M. F., Anderson, E., & Shapira, J. S. (2005) · Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology · doi:10.1097/01.wnn.0000191292.17964.bb · Cited by 360
The Neural Basis of Human Social Values: Evidence from Functional MRI
Zahn, R., Moll, J., Paiva, M., Garrido, G., Krueger, F., Huey, E. D., & Grafman, J. (2009) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhn080 · Cited by 328
Western Scrub-Jays Anticipate Future Needs Independently of Their Current Motivational State
Correia, S. P. C., Dickinson, A., & Clayton, N. S. (2007) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2007.03.063 · Cited by 258
(2009) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195331028.001.0001 · Cited by 28
Cited by
Cushman, F. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x19001730 · Cited by 260
The sense of should: A biologically-based framework for modeling social pressure
Theriault, J. E., Young, L., & Barrett, L. F. (2021) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2020.01.004 · Cited by 201
Sauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
SELF-REGULATION AND KNOWLEDGE HOW
Elzinga, B. (2018) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2016.45 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Railton, P.
- Venue
- Ethics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2014-07
- Volume
- 124
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 813-859
- ISSN
- 0014-1704 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-297X
- OpenAlex
- W1995987013
- Cited by
- 228
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 5.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.