The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Telling the Truth about Believing the Lies? Evidence for the Limited Prevalence of Expressive Survey Responding
Abstract
Large numbers of Americans endorse political rumors on surveys. But do they truly believe what they say? In this paper, I assess the extent to which subscription to political rumors represents genuine beliefs as opposed to expressive responses—rumor endorsements designed to express opposition to politicians and policies rather than genuine belief in false information. I ran several experiments, each designed to reduce expressive responding on two topics: among Republicans on the question of whether Barack Obama is a Muslim and among Democrats on whether members of the federal government had advance knowledge about 9/11. The null results of all experiments lead to the same conclusion: the incidence of expressive responding is very small, though somewhat larger for Democrats than Republicans. These results suggest that survey responses serve as a window into the underlying beliefs and true preferences of the mass public.
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“Contrary to these studies, recent work on the acceptance of rumors (Berinsky, 2018) reaches the conclusion that incentives and related interventions designed to increase the accuracy of survey responses have little impact on strongly valenced partisan beliefs.”
From Partisan Gaps in Political Information and Information-Seeking Behavior: Motivated Reasoning or Cheerleading? (2019) · cites this paper as Berinsky, 2018
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Cites
Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions
Bartels, L. M. (2002) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1023/a:1021226224601 · Cited by 1,468
Keeley, B. L. (1999) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2564659 · Cited by 581
Prior, M., Sood, G., & Khanna, K. (2015) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00014127 · Cited by 418
Do I Think BLS Data are BS? The Consequences of Conspiracy Theories
Einstein, K. L., & Glick, D. M. (2015) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-014-9287-z · Cited by 277
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Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034 · Cited by 3,603
Understanding Conspiracy Theories
Douglas, K. M., Uscinski, J. E., Sutton, R. M., Cichocka, A., Nefes, T., Ang, C. S., & Deravi, F. (2019) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12568 · Cited by 1,511
Tucker, J. A., Guess, A., Barbera, P., Vaccari, C., Siegel, A., Sanovich, S., Stukal, D., & Nyhan, B. (2018) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3144139 · Cited by 1,222
Science audiences, misinformation, and fake news
Scheufele, D. A., & Krause, N. M. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1805871115 · Cited by 878
Designing Information Provision Experiments
Haaland, I., Roth, C., & Wohlfart, J. (2023) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20211658 · Cited by 541
Vraga, E. K., & Bode, L. (2020) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/10584609.2020.1716500 · Cited by 479
Valenzuela, S., Halpern, D., Katz, J. E., & Miranda, J. P. (2019) · Digital Journalism · doi:10.1080/21670811.2019.1623701 · Cited by 307
Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them
(2018) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190844073.001.0001 · Cited by 284
Polarization: What Everyone Needs to Know®
McCarty, N. (2019) · doi:10.1093/wentk/9780190867782.001.0001 · Cited by 280
Why the backfire effect does not explain the durability of political misperceptions
Nyhan, B. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1912440117 · Cited by 280
Jerit, J., & Zhao, Y. (2020) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-032814 · Cited by 263
Peterson, E., & Iyengar, S. (2019) · doi:10.31235/osf.io/pmn7h · Cited by 241
“Contrary to these studies, recent work on the acceptance of rumors (Berinsky, 2018) reaches the conclusion that incentives and related interventions designed to increase the accuracy of survey responses have little impact on strongly valenced partisan beliefs.”
BackgroundResultErnala, S. K., Burke, M., Leavitt, A., & Ellison, N. B. (2020) · Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3313831.3376435 · Cited by 179
How Getting the Facts Right Can Fuel Partisan‐Motivated Reasoning
Bisgaard, M. (2019) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12432 · Cited by 147
Affective polarization and misinformation belief
Jenke, L. (2024) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-022-09851-w · Cited by 85
How Can Psychological Science Help Counter the Spread of Fake News?
van der Linden, S., Roozenbeek, J., Maertens, R., Basol, M., Kácha, O., Rathje, S., & Traberg, C. S. (2021) · The Spanish Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1017/sjp.2021.23 · Cited by 71
“Paying people to produce more accurate responses to politically contentious facts also leads to less polarized responses (Berinsky, 2018; Bullock et al., 2013; Bullock & Lenz, 2019; Jakesch et al., 2019; Prior et al., 2015; see also Tucker, 2020).”
BackgroundSocial Desirability and Affective Polarization
Connors, E. C. (2023) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfad053 · Cited by 22
Bursztyn, L., Haaland, I., Röver, N., & Roth, C. (2025) · doi:10.3386/w33920 · Cited by 18
Glinitzer, K., Gummer, T., & Wagner, M. (2021) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12734 · Cited by 17
Levy, N. (2021) · Bad Beliefs · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192895325.003.0005 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Berinsky, A. J.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2018-01
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 211-224
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2767034816
- Cited by
- 217
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 54.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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