The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence
Abstract
How can intuitions be used to validate or invalidate a philosophical theory? An intuition about a case seems to be a basic evidential source for the truth of that intuition, i.e., for the truth of the claim that a particular example is or isn’t an instance of a philosophically interesting kind, concept, or predicate. A mental‐state type is a basic evidential source only if its tokens reliably indicate the truth of their contents. The best way to account for intuitions being a basic evidential source is to interpret their subject matter in psychologistic terms. Intuitions provide evidence about the contents of the intuiter's concept, where “concept” is understood as a psychological structure.
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Cites
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Cited by
Williamson, T. (2007) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470696675 · Cited by 2,277
Knowledge and its Place in Nature
Kornblith, H. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199246319.001.0001 · Cited by 931
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions
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The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches
LUDWIG, K. (2007) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00160.x · Cited by 384
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Metadata
- Authors
- Goldman, A. I.
- Venue
- Pathways to Knowledge
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2002-01-31
- Pages
- 73-94
- OpenAlex
- W1549698369
- Cited by
- 187
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 60.97
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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