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The Predictive Mind
Abstract
Jakob Hohwy explores a new theory in neuroscience: the idea that the brain is essentially a hypothesis-testing mechanism that attempts to minimise the error of its predictions about sensory input. He explains the rich and multifaceted character of our conscious perception, and argues that the mind has a fragile indirect relation to the world.
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Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“According to these theories, predictions and incoming sensory input each have an associated precision (inverse variance) reflecting their confidence or reliability.”
From Precision weighting of cortical unsigned prediction error signals benefits learning, is mediated by dopamine, and is impaired in psychosis (2021) · cites this paper as [5]
In the citing paper
“The image of the brain as a prediction machine, constantly testing hypotheses against incoming evidence, provides an intuitive and generative way of thinking about neural function (Clark 2013; Hohwy 2013).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Hohwy 2013
In the citing paper
“the brain is not an elaborate stimulus-response link but a statistical organ that actively generates explanations for the stimuli it encounters—in terms of hypotheses that are tested against sensory evidence.”
From Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain (2016) · cites this paper as [5]
In the citing paper
“In AIF terms, the brain encodes a probabilistic generative model of the causes of its sensations, which it leverages to generate action”
From Active inference goes to school: the importance of active learning in the age of large language models (2024) · cites this paper as [35]
In the citing paper
“Rather than passively waiting for incoming sensory information, systems are proactive, generating ‘top–down’ predictions about future states”
From Active inference goes to school: the importance of active learning in the age of large language models (2024) · cites this paper as [35]
In the citing paper
“Perceptual inference, under these principles, associates conscious experience with the ‘explanation’ for the sensorium that minimizes prediction error throughout the hierarchy”
From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Hohwy, 2013
In the citing paper
“Predictive processing theories of cognition treat the brain as a neurally instantiated processing hierarchy, with generative models at higher levels predicting bottom-up inputs from lower levels.”
From Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience (2017) · cites this paper as Hohwy 2013
In the citing paper
“Error signals are cancelled either by updating the model or by taking action to alter the discrepant input (Hohwy 2013).”
From Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience (2017) · cites this paper as Hohwy 2013
In the citing paper
“The discrepancy between predicted and actual input takes the form of an error signal.”
From Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience (2017) · cites this paper as Hohwy 2013
In the citing paper
“This may explain the historical affinity between Active Inference based accounts of consciousness and Global Workspace Theory (Hohwy, 2013; Whyte, 2019), which identifies access consciousness as the primary (and perhaps exclusive) explanandum for the science of consciousness (Cohen & Dennett, 2011; Dehaene et al., 2006; Naccache, 2018).”
From Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review (2026) · cites this paper as Hohwy, 2013
In the citing paper
“Predictive coding extends the above by positing a specific computational strategy for the brain: minimise the error between expected and actual inputs (15, 16).”
From Predictive coding and neurocomputational psychiatry: a mechanistic framework for understanding mental disorders (2026) · cites this paper as [16]
In the citing paper
“Recent developments in cognitive science and neuroscience have led to a growth of interest in “predictive processing” theories of mind and cognitive function (Clark 2013; Friston 2010; Hohwy 2013). These diverse approaches share a common ground in situating top-down, error-minimising predictions as the key locus of information processing, as opposed to more classical accounts which emphasize feed-”
From From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind (2018) · cites this paper as Hohwy 2013
Citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Seth, A. K. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 · Cited by 1,816
The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization
Barrett, L. F. (2016) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsw154 · Cited by 1,426
“This hypothesis is variously called predictive coding, active inference, or belief propagation (e.g. Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2010; Seth et al. , 2012; Clark, 2013a,b; Hohwy, 2013; Seth, 2013; Barrett and Simmons, 2015; Chanes and Barrett, 2016; Deneve and Jardri, 2016).”
Active inference: a process theory
Friston, K., FitzGerald, T., Rigoli, F., Schwartenbeck, P., & Pezzulo, G. (2017) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_00912 · Cited by 1,156
Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain
Seth, A. K., & Friston, K. J. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2016.0007 · Cited by 945
The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization
Barrett, L. F. (2017) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsx060 · Cited by 950
“This hypothesis is variously called predictive coding, active inference, or belief propagation (e.g. Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2010; Seth et al., 2012; Clark, 2013a,b; Hohwy, 2013; Seth, 2013; Barrett and Simmons, 2015; Chanes and Barrett, 2016; Deneve and Jardri, 2016).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Hohwy, J.
- Affiliations
- Monash University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Hohwy, Jakob
- ORCID
- Hohwy, Jakob
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2013-11-28
- OpenAlex
- W379488513
- Cited by
- 1,914
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 187 · 2025: 197 · 2024: 175 · 2023: 132 · 2022: 133 · 2021: 175 · 2020: 214 · 2019: 202 · 2018: 142 · 2017: 138 · 2016: 93 · 2015: 86 · 2014: 32 · 2013: 6
- FWCI
- 27.55
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Libraries (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), l'Université de Namur (UNamur) and the Université Saint-Louis (USL-B)) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- predictive processing, hypothesis testing, prediction error, conscious perception, sensory prediction, mind-brain relationship, Bayesian inference
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