The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind
Abstract
This book surveys philosophical issues raised by the situated movement in cognitive science—the treatment of cognitive phenomena as the joint product of brain, body, and environment. The book focuses specifically on the hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which human cognitive processes literally comprise elements beyond the boundary of the human organism. A systems-based approach is held to provide the only plausible criterion distinguishing what is cognitive from what is not. In most human cases, this system appears within the boundary of the human organism. It is argued that the systems-based view explains the existing successes of cognitive psychology and cognate fields in a way that extended conceptions of cognition do not and, furthermore, that once the systems-based view has been adopted, it is especially clear how extant arguments in support of the extended view go wrong. Additional aspects of the situated program, including the embedded and embodied views, are also examined. The book considers whether plausible incarnations of such views depart from orthodox, computational cognitive science, especially with regard to the role of representation and computation. It is argued that the embedded and embodied views do not constitute radical shifts in perspective. For instance, properly understood, the embodied view does not offer a new role for the nonneural body, different in principle from the one presupposed by orthodox cognitive science.
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Citations
Cites
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Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
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Cited by
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The Cognitive Integration of E-Memory
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4E cognition and the dogma of harmony
Aagaard, J. (2021) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2020.1845640 · Cited by 73
The reappearing tool: transparency, smart technology, and the extended mind
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Inference to the hypothesis of extended cognition
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Externalized memory in slime mould and the extended (non-neuronal) mind
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Abstract Concepts and the Embodied Mind: Rethinking Grounded Cognition
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Transactive Memory Reconstructed: Rethinking Wegner's Research Program
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Toward an Enactive Conception of Productive Practices: Beyond Material Agency
Di Paolo, E. A., Lawler, D., & Vaccari, A. P. (2023) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-023-00632-9 · Cited by 17
“Much of the thrust behind MET derives from advances in embodied cognitive sciences, notably not only the enactive language expressed in the last quote but also the extended functionalism of Andy Clark (2008), Michael Wheeler (2010), and others (e.g., Rowlands, 2009; Rupert, 2009).”
BackgroundMoral Reasons Not to Posit Extended Cognitive Systems: a Reply to Farina and Lavazza
Cassinadri, G. (2022) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-022-00560-0 · Cited by 14
From cognition’s location to the epistemology of its nature
Barker, M. J. (2010) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.05.001 · Cited by 13
Demarcating the Realm of Cognition
Varga, S. (2018) · Journal for General Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s10838-017-9375-y · Cited by 10
Levy, N. (2021) · Bad Beliefs · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192895325.003.0005 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Rupert, R. D.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2009-09-01
- OpenAlex
- W1556997081
- Cited by
- 411
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 13.57
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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