The magical number two, plus or minus: Dual-process theory as a theory of cognitive kinds
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This chapter considers the question of whether there is some general, distinctive, and plausible dual-process thesis about cognition. It argues that there is such an account, called the type version of dual-process theory. The first section identifies a substantive and interesting class of hypotheses worthy of the ‘dual-process’ label and contrasts them with some other, rather more banal claims. The second section distinguishes between two quite different versions of the hypothesis: one on which dual-process theory is construed as a thesis about cognitive tokens, the other on which it is a thesis about cognitive types. The third section sketches the reasons for rejecting the cognitive tokens version of dual-process theory. The fourth section highlights the virtues of the cognitive types version. The last section concludes that given a clear understanding of the cognitive types proposal, one can deflect the main general objections to dual-process theorizing.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Working Memory, Thought, and Action
Baddeley, A. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528012.001.0001 · Cited by 2,432
How (and where) does moral judgment work?
Greene, J., & Haidt, J. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)02011-9 · Cited by 1,945 · cited 1×
“( Greene & Haidt, 2002 ) reasoning about the minds of others (Leslie, 2004) enumerative”
BackgroundIndividual Differences in Working Memory Capacity and Dual-Process Theories of the Mind.
Barrett, L. F., Tugade, M. M., & Engle, R. W. (2004) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.130.4.553 · Cited by 913 · cited 1×
“supported by empirical research (Baddeley, 2007; Barrett et al., 2004 ).”
MethodLogic and human reasoning: An assessment of the deduction paradigm.
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2002) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037//0033-2909.128.6.978 · Cited by 431
Cited by
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
Intuition and Reasoning: A Dual-Process Perspective
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2010) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2010.521057 · Cited by 385
Stanovich, K. E. (2012) · The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0022 · Cited by 169
Gilhooly, K. J., & Fioratou, E. (2009) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546780903178615 · Cited by 143
“Type 1 processes are fast, automatic and unconscious while Type 2 processes are seen as slow, effortful and conscious (Samuels, 2009).”
BackgroundStanovich, K. E., West, R. F., & Toplak, M. E. (2011) · The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511977244.040 · Cited by 77
Metadata
- Authors
- Samuels, R.
- Venue
- In two minds: Dual processes and beyond
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2009-01-29
- Pages
- 129-146
- OpenAlex
- W2499811921
- Cited by
- 110
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 21.15
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The magical number two, plus or minus: Dual-process theory as a theory of cognitive kinds. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230167.003.0006
- The paper
- Samuels, R. (2009). The magical number two, plus or minus: Dual-process theory as a theory of cognitive kinds. In two minds: Dual processes and beyond. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780199230167.003.0006
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.