The DOI matches its Crossref record; 113 of the 113 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dual-process theories: A metacognitive perspective
Abstract
This chapter develops a framework for predicting S2 intervention that is based on metacognitive experiences associated with S1 processes. In particular, it develops the argument that the outcome of a given reasoning attempt is determined not only by the content of the information which is retrieved by S1 and analysed by S2, but also by a second-order judgement. This metacognitive judgement is largely based on the experience associated with the execution of S1 and S2 processes, and it is this judgement that determines whether, and how, S2 processes are engaged.
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Citations
Cites
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
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Cited by
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
Intuition, reason, and metacognition
Thompson, V. A., Prowse Turner, J. A., & Pennycook, G. (2011) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2011.06.001 · Cited by 703
Self-citationWhat makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement
Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2015) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.05.001 · Cited by 475
Meta-Reasoning: Monitoring and Control of Thinking and Reasoning
Ackerman, R., & Thompson, V. A. (2017) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2017.05.004 · Cited by 400
Self-citationIntuition and Reasoning: A Dual-Process Perspective
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2010) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2010.521057 · Cited by 385
Metadata
- Authors
- Thompson, V. A.
- Venue
- In two minds: Dual processes and beyond
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2009-01-29
- Pages
- 171-196
- OpenAlex
- W2492109479
- Cited by
- 269
- References
- 113
- FWCI
- 94.58
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.