The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis
Open accessAbstract
Should the buyer of a customized good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we consider several possible determinants that may influence the choice of auctions versus negotiations. We then examine a comprehensive data set of private sector building contracts awarded in Northern California during the years 1995–2000. The analysis suggests a number of possible limitations to the use of auctions. Auctions may perform poorly when projects are complex, contractual design is incomplete, and there are few available bidders. Furthermore, auctions may stifle communication between buyers and sellers, preventing the buyer from utilizing the contractor's expertise when designing the project. Some implications of these results for procurement in the public sector are discussed (JEL D23, D82, H57, L14, L22, L74).
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Cites
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Self-citationThe Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement
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Antonopoulos, I., Robu, V., Couraud, B., Kirli, D., Norbu, S., Kiprakis, A., Flynn, D., Elizondo-Gonzalez, S., & Wattam, S. (2020) · Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.rser.2020.109899 · Cited by 656
Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs
Bajari, P., Houghton, S., & Tadelis, S. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.4.1288 · Cited by 363
Self-citationThe Simple Microeconomics of Public‐Private Partnerships
IOSSA, E., & MARTIMORT, D. (2015) · Journal of Public Economic Theory · doi:10.1111/jpet.12114 · Cited by 344
Political Connections and Allocative Distortions
SCHOENHERR, D. (2019) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12751 · Cited by 328
Three domains of project organising
Winch, G. M. (2014) · International Journal of Project Management · doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2013.10.012 · Cited by 256
Metadata
- Authors
- Bajari, P., McMillan, R., & Tadelis, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2008-05-07
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 372-399
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- 8756-6222
- OpenAlex
- W3022209982
- Cited by
- 444
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 28.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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