The Unity of Grounding
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I argue—contra moderate grounding pluralists such as Kit Fine and more extreme grounding pluralists such as Jessica Wilson—that there is fundamentally only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation. I also argue that this single relation is indispensable for normative theorizing—that we can’t make sense of, for example, the debate over consequentialism without it. It follows from what I argue that there is no metaethically-pure normative ethics (in contrast to Ronald Dworkin’s claim that there is no normatively-pure metaethics).
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Cites
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BackgroundInfluentialA Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value
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BackgroundConstruction area (no hard hat required)
Bennett, K. (2011) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9703-8 · Cited by 252
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Cited by
An Epistemic Nonconsequentialism
Sylvan, K. L. (2020) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-7890455 · Cited by 164
Why Truthmaking Is Not a Case of Grounding
Audi, P. (2020) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12605 · Cited by 47
Oberle, T. (2026) · Religious Studies · doi:10.1017/s0034412525100978 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Berker, S.
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2017-06-27
- Volume
- 127
- Issue
- 507
- Pages
- 729-777
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W2724466685
- Cited by
- 190
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 196.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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