Consciousness as a multidimensional phenomenon: implications for the assessment of disorders of consciousness
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Disorders of consciousness (DoCs) pose a significant clinical and ethical challenge because they allow for complex forms of conscious experience in patients where intentional behaviour and communication are highly limited or non-existent. There is a pressing need for brain-based assessments that can precisely and accurately characterize the conscious state of individual DoC patients. There has been an ongoing research effort to develop neural measures of consciousness. However, these measures are challenging to validate not only due to our lack of ground truth about consciousness in many DoC patients but also because there is an open ontological question about consciousness. There is a growing, well-supported view that consciousness is a multidimensional phenomenon that cannot be fully described in terms of the theoretical construct of hierarchical, easily ordered conscious levels. The multidimensional view of consciousness challenges the utility of levels-based neural measures in the context of DoC assessment. To examine how these measures may map onto consciousness as a multidimensional phenomenon, this article will investigate a range of studies where they have been applied in states other than DoC and where more is known about conscious experience. This comparative evidence suggests that measures of conscious level are more sensitive to some dimensions of consciousness than others and cannot be assumed to provide a straightforward hierarchical characterization of conscious states. Elevated levels of brain complexity, for example, are associated with conscious states characterized by a high degree of sensory richness and minimal attentional constraints, but are suboptimal for goal-directed behaviour and external responsiveness. Overall, this comparative analysis indicates that there are currently limitations to the use of these measures as tools to evaluate consciousness as a multidimensional phenomenon and that the relationship between these neural signatures and phenomenology requires closer scrutiny.
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Citations
Cites
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“PCI was inspired by theoretical approaches in consciousness science postulating that the emergence of consciousness requires an optimal balance of integration and differentiation in functional neuronal circuitry (Tononi and Edelman 1998; Tononi 2004; Seth et al. 2006).”
MethodThe Science of Mind Wandering: Empirically Navigating the Stream of Consciousness
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“This includes a reduction in various dimensions of consciousness that modulate attention and the flow of thought, including ‘deliberate’ constraints on thought (those under cognitive control, such as executive function, volition and typically meta-awareness), as well as ‘automatic’ constraints on thought (those operat…”
BackgroundA theoretically based index of consciousness independent of sensory processing and behavior
Casali, A. G., Gosseries, O., Rosanova, M., Boly, M., Sarasso, S., Casali, K. R., Casarotto, S., Bruno, M.-A., Laureys, S., Tononi, G., et al. (2013) · Science Translational Medicine · doi:10.1126/scitranslmed.3006294 · Cited by 1,246 · cited 7×
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Cited by
Functional geometry of the cortex encodes dimensions of consciousness
Huang, Z., Mashour, G. A., & Hudetz, A. G. (2023) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-022-35764-7 · Cited by 101
“Various undesired components, including linear and nonlinear drift, time series of head motion and its temporal derivative, and mean time series from thewhitematter and cerebrospinalfluid, were removed via linear regression; (7) Spatial smoothing with 6mm full-width at halfmaximum isotropic Gaussian kernel; (8) Each v…”
MethodLee, A. Y. (2023) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12421 · Cited by 57
Are we really unconscious in “unconscious” states? Common assumptions revisited
Sevenius Nilsen, A., Juel, B. E., Thürer, B., Aamodt, A., & Storm, J. F. (2022) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2022.987051 · Cited by 49
What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review
Páleník, J. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1430262 · Cited by 4
“Or, at least, this is the claim of a number of recent papers in the field of consciousness research (Fazekas and Overgaard, 2016; Jonkisz et al., 2017; Bayne and Carter, 2018; Walter, 2021; Huang et al., 2023).”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Walter, J.
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2021-12-01
- Volume
- 2021
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- niab047-niab047
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4200077041
- Cited by
- 31
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 5.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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