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About the compatibility between the perturbational complexity index and the global neuronal workspace theory of consciousness
Open accessAbstract
This paper investigates the compatibility between the theoretical framework of the global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT) of conscious processing and the perturbational complexity index (PCI). Even if it has been introduced within the framework of a concurrent theory (i.e. Integrated Information Theory), PCI appears, in principle, compatible with the main tenet of GNWT, which is a conscious process that depends on a long-range connection between different cortical regions, more specifically on the amplification, global propagation, and integration of brain signals. Notwithstanding this basic compatibility, a number of limited compatibilities and apparent differences emerge. This paper starts from the description of brain complexity, a notion that is crucial for PCI, to then summary of the main features of PCI and the main tenets of GNWT. Against this background, the text explores the compatibility between PCI and GNWT. It concludes that GNWT and PCI are fundamentally compatible, even though there are some partial disagreements and some points to further examine.
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“Although many of these theories might lend their support to the same suite of C-tests [63], others clearly differ in terms of which C-tests they support”
From Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond (2024) · cites this paper as [63]
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“Third, although there are open questions about how far beyond the consensus cases the iterative re fi nement of theories, measures, and tests might eventually take us, some optimism on this front can be drawn from the signi fi cant theoretical [49] and empirical [63] convergence on complexity-related measures of global states of consciousness in humans.”
From Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond (2024) · cites this paper as [63]
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“However, GWT is not conceptually incompatible with the dimensional description or structure of consciousness, and neither is it, as has been recently argued ( Farisco and Changeux, 2023 ), incompatible with the use of complexity measures to characterize states of consciousness.”
From What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review (2024) · cites this paper as Farisco and Changeux, 2023
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In the citing paper
“For instance, a corollary of DIT is that prior knowledge (e.g., semantic memory), that relates to the associations made with perceptual processes, should be dependent on the influence of synapses connecting to the apical compartment.”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [127]
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationTowards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498 · cited 1×
“In the end, what we experience as a conscious state is global availability of information (Dehaene and Naccache 2001).”
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Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis
Mashour, G. A., Roelfsema, P., Changeux, J.-P., & Dehaene, S. (2020) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2020.01.026 · Cited by 1,164 · cited 7×
“…the neuronal structures involved in conscious processing, as seen earlier, for GNWT, the frontal cortex with its long-distance fiber tracts plays an important role in sustaining long-range functional connectivity in networks supporting the GNW and therefore conscious access (Mashour, et al. 2020).”
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Cited by
Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., Massimini, M., Shepherd, J., Cleeremans, A., Fleming, S. M., Malach, R., Mattingley, J. B., Menon, D. K., Owen, A. M., et al. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010 · Cited by 198
Anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness
Mashour, G. A. (2024) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2024.03.002 · Cited by 127
An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness
Storm, J. F., Klink, P. C., Aru, J., Senn, W., Goebel, R., Pigorini, A., Avanzini, P., Vanduffel, W., Roelfsema, P. R., Massimini, M., et al. (2024) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2024.02.004 · Cited by 114
“13,14,102,171 The field is already benefiting from a broader palette of empirical tools and measures.”
Preliminaries to artificial consciousness: A multidimensional heuristic approach
Evers, K., Farisco, M., Chatila, R., Earp, B. D., Freire, I. T., Hamker, F. H., Németh, E., Verschure, P. F. M. J., & Khamassi, M. (2025) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2025.01.002 · Cited by 27
Self-citationNegro, N. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae012 · Cited by 21
Metadata
- Authors
- Farisco, M., & Changeux, J.-P.
- Affiliations
- Uppsala University (SE)
- Institut Pasteur (FR)
- Corresponding author
- Farisco, Michele
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2023-01-01
- Volume
- 2023
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- niad016-niad016
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC10279414
- OpenAlex
- W4381251751
- Cited by
- 29
- References
- 58
- Citations by year
- 2025: 17 · 2024: 12
- FWCI
- 7.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Uppsala University Publications (Uppsala University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- European Commission (HORIZON2020, 101071178, 945539)
- Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (#945539, Grant Agreement No. 945539, 101071178)
- HORIZON EUROPE European Innovation Council (101071178)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Functional Brain Connectivity Studies
- Keywords
- perturbational complexity index, global neuronal workspace theory, consciousness, brain complexity, integrated information theory, neural integration
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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