Dual-process theories and consciousness: the case for ‘Type Zero’ cognition: Table 1.
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A step towards a theory of consciousness would be to characterize the effect of consciousness on information processing. One set of results suggests that the effect of consciousness is to interfere with computations that are optimally performed non-consciously. Another set of results suggests that conscious, system 2 processing is the home of norm-compliant computation. This is contrasted with system 1 processing, thought to be typically unconscious, which operates with useful but error-prone heuristics. These results can be reconciled by separating out two different distinctions: between conscious and non-conscious representations, on the one hand, and between automatic and deliberate processes, on the other. This pair of distinctions is used to illuminate some existing experimental results and to resolve the puzzle about whether consciousness helps or hinders accurate information processing. This way of resolving the puzzle shows the importance of another category, which we label 'type 0 cognition', characterized by automatic computational processes operating on non-conscious representations.
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BackgroundInfluentialWhy do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
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Birch, J. (2022) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12351 · Cited by 254
“I will now propose an approach which synthesizes ideas from, among others, Allen (2004), Ginsburg and Jablonka (2019) and Andrews (2020), Shea and Bayne (2010), Shea and Frith (2016).”
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Unconscious perceptual justification*
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Metadata
- Authors
- Shea, N., & Frith, C. D.
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2016
- Volume
- 2016
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- niw005
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2346841252
- Cited by
- 63
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 8.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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