The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Political Economy of Finance
Open accessAbstract
The regulations that shape the design and operations of corporations and credit and securities markets differ vastly from country to country. In addition, similar regulations are often unequally enforced in different countries. Economists still have an imperfect understanding of why these international differences exist and of whether they tend to persist over time. However, a recent strand of research has shown that some progress on these issues can be made using the approach of the new political economy, which models regulation and its enforcement as the result of the balance of power between social and economic constituencies. In this paper we offer a first assessment of the results and potential of this approach in three fields: corporate finance, banking, and securities markets.
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- Pagano, M.
- Venue
- Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2001-12-01
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 502-519
- ISSN
- 0266-903X (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2121
- OpenAlex
- W2161670104
- Cited by
- 335
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 56.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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