The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes
Abstract
Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization, yet informal or horizontal sanctions have attracted more attention of late. We study experimentally a collective action dilemma and test whether subjects choose a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, as predicted by standard economic theory, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions (IS) or no sanctions. Our subjects choose, and succeed in using, IS surprisingly often, their voting decisions being responsive to the cost of formal sanctions. Adoption by voting enhances the efficiency of both IS and non-deterrent formal sanctions. Results are qualitatively confirmed under several permutations of the experimental design.
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Cites
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making
Frederick, S. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005775196732 · Cited by 5,256
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems
Ostrom, E. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.3.641 · Cited by 4,529 · cited 1×
“Ostrom (2010) provides several examples that “challenge the presumption that governments always do a better job than users in organizing and protecting important resources” (p. 641) and asserts that “the earlier theories of rational, but helpless, individuals who are trapped in social dilemmas are…”
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193904 · Cited by 3,970
Antisocial Punishment Across Societies
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1153808 · Cited by 2,038
Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., & Bowles, S. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1183665 · Cited by 613
Cited by
Normative foundations of human cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schurtenberger, I. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0385-5 · Cited by 434
The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research
Dannenberg, A., & Gallier, C. (2020) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-019-09629-8 · Cited by 75
Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment
Dannenberg, A., Haita-Falah, C., & Zitzelsberger, S. (2020) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-019-09609-y · Cited by 26
Metadata
- Authors
- Markussen, T., Putterman, L., & Tyran, J.-R.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-09-17
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 301-324
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2104571450
- Cited by
- 179
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 31.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Markussen, T., Putterman, L., & Tyran, J.-R. (2014). Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdt022
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