The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Board Control and Size
Abstract
This article presents a model of optimal control of corporate boards of directors. We determine when one would expect inside versus outside directors to control the board, when the controlling party will delegate decision-making to the other party, the extent of communication between the parties, and the number of outside directors. We show that shareholders can sometimes be better off with an insider-controlled board. We derive endogenous relationships among profits, board control, and the number of outside directors that call into question the usual interpretation of some documented empirical regularities. (JEL G34)
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal corporate governance
Wintoki, M. B., Linck, J. S., & Netter, J. M. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.03.005 · Cited by 3,005
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Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US
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The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis
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Metadata
- Authors
- Harris, M., & Raviv, A.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2006-07-20
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1797-1832
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2004531271
- Cited by
- 1,144
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 123.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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