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Cited by 415

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Do Shareholder Rights Affect the Cost of Bank Loans?

Open access
Chava, Sudheer, Livdan, Dmitry, Purnanandam, Amiyatosh·2009·Review of Financial Studies

Abstract

Using a large sample of bank loans issued to U.S. firms between 1990 and 2004, we find that lower takeover defenses (as proxied by the lower G-index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003) significantly increase the cost of loans for a firm. Firms with lowest takeover defense (democracy) pay a 25% higher spread on their bank loans as compared with firms with the highest takeover defense (dictatorship), after controlling for various firm and loan characteristics. Further investigations indicate that banks charge a higher loan spread to firms with higher takeover vulnerability mainly because of their concern about a substantial increase in financial risk after the takeover. Our results have important implications for understanding the link between a firm's governance structure and its cost of capital. Our study suggests that firms that rely too much on corporate control market as a governance device are punished by costlier bank loans.

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Metadata

Authors
Chava, S., Livdan, D., & Purnanandam, A.
Venue
Review of Financial Studies
Published
2008-12-23
Volume
22
Issue
8
Pages
2973-3004
ISSN
  • 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-7368
OpenAlex
W3122861024
Cited by
415
References
49
FWCI
62.52
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Do Shareholder Rights Affect the Cost of Bank Loans? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/rfs/hhn111
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Chava, S., Livdan, D., & Purnanandam, A. (2009). Do Shareholder Rights Affect the Cost of Bank Loans? Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn111

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