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Do Shareholder Rights Affect the Cost of Bank Loans?
Open accessAbstract
Using a large sample of bank loans issued to U.S. firms between 1990 and 2004, we find that lower takeover defenses (as proxied by the lower G-index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003) significantly increase the cost of loans for a firm. Firms with lowest takeover defense (democracy) pay a 25% higher spread on their bank loans as compared with firms with the highest takeover defense (dictatorship), after controlling for various firm and loan characteristics. Further investigations indicate that banks charge a higher loan spread to firms with higher takeover vulnerability mainly because of their concern about a substantial increase in financial risk after the takeover. Our results have important implications for understanding the link between a firm's governance structure and its cost of capital. Our study suggests that firms that rely too much on corporate control market as a governance device are punished by costlier bank loans.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Chava, S., Livdan, D., & Purnanandam, A.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2008-12-23
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 2973-3004
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W3122861024
- Cited by
- 415
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 62.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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