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The Sensitivity of Corporate Cash Holdings to Corporate Governance
Open accessAbstract
The average cash holdings of Chinese-listed firms decreased significantly after the split share structure reform in China, which specified a process that allowed previously nontradable shares held by controlling shareholders to be freely tradable on the exchanges. The reduction in cash holdings is greater for firms with weaker governance and firms facing more financial constraints prior to the reform. The reform also significantly reduced the average corporate savings rate, as measured by cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity. These findings are consistent with the premise that the reform removed a significant market friction, which led to better incentive alignment between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and relaxed financial constraints. Additional analyses show that the reform affects firms' cash management policies, investment decisions, dividend payout policies, and financing choices differently in private firms than in state-owned enterprises.
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China׳s secondary privatization: Perspectives from the Split-Share Structure Reform
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Navigating through economic policy uncertainty: The role of corporate cash holdings
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Tan, Y., Tian, X., Zhang, X., & Zhao, H. (2020) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101661 · Cited by 326
Corporate social responsibility and corporate cash holdings
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Metadata
- Authors
- Chen, Q., Chen, X., Schipper, K., Xu, Y., & Xue, J.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2012-09-28
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 3610-3644
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2007155646
- Cited by
- 365
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 56.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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