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Cited by 1,020Corporate Social Responsibility ReportingCorporate Finance and GovernanceNonprofit Sector and Volunteering

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy

Open access
Masulis, Ronald W., Reza, Syed Walid·2015·Review of Financial Studies
DOI 10.1093/rfs/hhu082
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Abstract

Evaluating agency theory and optimal contracting theory views of corporate philanthropy, we find that as corporate giving increases, shareholders reduce their valuation of firm cash holdings.Dividend increases following the 2003 Tax Reform Act are associated with reduced corporate giving.Using a natural experiment, we find that corporate giving is positively (negatively) associated with CEO charity preferences (CEO shareholdings and corporate governance quality).Evidence from CEO-affiliated charity donations, market reactions to insider-affiliated donations, its relation to CEO compensation, and firm contributions to director-affiliated charities indicates that corporate donations advance CEO interests and suggests misuses of corporate resources that reduce firm value.

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Crossref · 10.1093/rfs/hhu082

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30 of 30 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 30 references

Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Altschuller, 2010, Distinctions with differences: The lawyer's role in distinguishing CSR and corporate philanthropy, International Law News, 39, 11
  2. Bebchuk L. Fried J. Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press; 2004.
  3. Chetty, 2005, Dividend taxs and corporate behavior: Evidence from the 2003 dividend tax cut, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 3, 791
  4. Cohen, 2002, Corporate giving: De-cloaking stealth philanthropy, Nonprofit Quarterly, 9, 47
  5. Hermalin, 1998, Endogenously chosen board of directors and their monitoring of the CEO, American Economic Review, 88, 96
  6. KrÜger P. Corporate goodness and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics. Forthcoming.
  7. Monk R. A. G. Minow N. Corporate governance. 3rd. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley; 2004.

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Metadata

Authors
Masulis, R. W., & Reza, S. W.
Affiliations
  • UNSW Sydney (AU)
  • Queensland University of Technology (AU)
ORCID
Venue
Review of Financial Studies
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2014-11-18
Volume
28
Issue
2
Pages
592-636
ISSN
  • 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-7368
DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhu082
OpenAlex
W2247506531
Cited by
1,020
References
30
Citations by year
2026: 101 · 2025: 156 · 2024: 161 · 2023: 140 · 2022: 138 · 2021: 85 · 2020: 95 · 2019: 50 · 2018: 38 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 3
FWCI
53.29
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Review of Financial Studies (publishedVersion)
  • QUT ePrints (Queensland University of Technology) (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • QUT Business School
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering
Keywords
corporate philanthropy, agency theory, optimal contracting, shareholder valuation, cash holdings, dividends, CEO shareholding, corporate governance quality, CEO compensation, firm value

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