The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Neuroimaging studies on moral decision-making have thus far largely focused on differences between moral judgments with opposing utilitarian (well-being maximizing) and deontological (duty-based) content. However, these studies have investigated moral dilemmas involving extreme situations, and did not control for two distinct dimensions of moral judgment: whether or not it is intuitive (immediately compelling to most people) and whether it is utilitarian or deontological in content. By contrasting dilemmas where utilitarian judgments are counterintuitive with dilemmas in which they are intuitive, we were able to use functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify the neural correlates of intuitive and counterintuitive judgments across a range of moral situations. Irrespective of content (utilitarian/deontological), counterintuitive moral judgments were associated with greater difficulty and with activation in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting that such judgments may involve emotional conflict; intuitive judgments were linked to activation in the visual and premotor cortex. In addition, we obtained evidence that neural differences in moral judgment in such dilemmas are largely due to whether they are intuitive and not, as previously assumed, to differences between utilitarian and deontological judgments. Our findings therefore do not support theories that have generally associated utilitarian and deontological judgments with distinct neural systems.
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Citations
Cites
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Spatial registration and normalization of images
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Meeting of minds: the medial frontal cortex and social cognition
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“Increased rACC activation has been tied to representation of what others think about us (Amodio and Frith, 2006), as well as to guilt, an emotional response to the belief that one has violated moral standards (Zahn et al.”
BackgroundThe Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027 · Cited by 2,620 · cited 15×
“As expected, most DI dilemmas were scenarios previously used by Greene et al. (2001, 2004) where the better consequence required violating a duty not to harm (five out of eight DI dilemmas; Supplementary Data), and most UI dilemmas involved a conflict between the better consequence and other duties…”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialPeople thinking about thinking peopleThe role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind”
Saxe, R., & Kanwisher, N. (2003) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/s1053-8119(03)00230-1 · Cited by 2,316 · cited 1×
“The TPJ has been implicated in theory of mind tasks (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe and Wexler, 2005), and in tasks involving selfawareness and agency (Decety and Lamm, 2007).”
Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05631 · Cited by 1,545 · cited 2×
“…supported by studies of patients with VMPFC lesions which show an abnormally frequent tendency to make utilitarian judgments in personal dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007), but also an abnormally frequent tendency to make vindictive responses in the Ultimatum game (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007),…”
BackgroundThe Neural Substrate of Human Empathy: Effects of Perspective-taking and Cognitive Appraisal
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“The rACC has been implicated in the calculation of costs and benefits (Rudebeck et al., 2006; Walton et al., 2007) and emotional conflict resolution (Etkin et al., 2006).”
MethodCognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment
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“Since these areas were not previously noted as central to moral cognition (Moll et al., 2005), it seems plausible that the observed neural activity reflects not the processes directly underlying intuitive judgments, but the processes that trigger them by making aspects of a moral situation more…”
Background
Cited by
Action, Outcome, and Value: A Dual-System Framework for Morality
Cushman, F. (2013) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868313495594 · Cited by 473
Beyond sacrificial harm: a two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Caviola, L., Faber, N. S., Crockett, M. J., & Savulescu, J. (2018) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000093 · Cited by 434
Beyond point-and-shoot morality: why cognitive (neuro)science matters for ethics
Greene, J. D. (2014) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/675875 · Cited by 375
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Farias, M., & Savulescu, J. (2015) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.10.005 · Cited by 315
Self-citationWhat we say and what we do: The relationship between real and hypothetical moral choices
FeldmanHall, O., Mobbs, D., Evans, D., Hiscox, L., Navrady, L., & Dalgleish, T. (2012) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.02.001 · Cited by 312
Sauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
Metadata
- Authors
- Kahane, G., Wiech, K., Shackel, N., Farias, M., Savulescu, J., & Tracey, I.
- Venue
- Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-03-18
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 393-402
- ISSN
- 1749-5016 (ISSN-L)
- 1749-5024
- OpenAlex
- W2096140599
- Cited by
- 147
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 5.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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