High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
As punishment can be essential to cooperation and norm maintenance but costly to the punisher, many evolutionary game-theoretic studies have explored how direct punishment can evolve in populations. Compared to direct punishment, in which an agent acts to punish another for an interaction in which both parties were involved, the evolution of third-party punishment (3PP) is even more puzzling, because the punishing agent itself was not involved in the original interaction. Despite significant empirical studies of 3PP, little is known about the conditions under which it can evolve. We find that punishment reputation is not, by itself, sufficient for the evolution of 3PP. Drawing on research streams in sociology and psychology, we implement a structured population model and show that high strength-of-ties and low mobility are critical for the evolution of responsible 3PP. Only in such settings of high social-structural constraint are punishers able to induce self-interested agents toward cooperation, making responsible 3PP ultimately beneficial to individuals as well as the collective. Our results illuminate the conditions under which 3PP is evolutionarily adaptive in populations. Responsible 3PP can evolve and induce cooperation in cases where other mechanisms alone fail to do so.
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Citations
Cites
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894 · cited 2×
“Kinship plays an important in the evolution of cooperation [21,22] and is also key to the evolution of 3PP in our model.”
BackgroundAltruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616 · cited 1×
“Yet, while significant empirical evidence exists that humans [13,14] and non-human species [16] are indeed willing and act to punish in the role of an uninvolved third party, very little is known about the evolutionary conditions under which 3PP can evolve.”
BackgroundFehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02043 · Cited by 3,475 · cited 1×
“Yet, while significant empirical evidence exists that humans [13,14] and non-human species [16] are indeed willing and act to punish in the role of an uninvolved third party, very little is known about the evolutionary conditions under which 3PP can evolve.”
BackgroundA simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04605 · Cited by 2,208 · cited 4×
“[2] Boehm, C.”
BackgroundInfluentialAntisocial Punishment Across Societies
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1153808 · Cited by 2,038
The evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1992) · Ethology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y · Cited by 1,482
Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
Henrich, J. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00094-5 · Cited by 1,096
Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem
Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02978 · Cited by 865 · cited 5×
“There exists a large evolutionary game literature exploring effects of population structure on evolutionary outcomes (see [23, 24] for reviews), but structured population models on punishment have only considered direct punishment and not 3PP [4, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29].”
BackgroundInfluential(2001) · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202 · Cited by 803
Cited by
Richerson, P., Baldini, R., Bell, A. V., Demps, K., Frost, K., Hillis, V., Mathew, S., Newton, E. K., Naar, N., Newson, L., et al. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x1400106x · Cited by 639
Societal threat and cultural variation in the strength of social norms: An evolutionary basis
Roos, P., Gelfand, M., Nau, D., & Lun, J. (2015) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.01.003 · Cited by 232
Self-citationCultural differences in moral judgment and behavior, across and within societies
Graham, J., Meindl, P., Beall, E., Johnson, K. M., & Zhang, L. (2016) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.09.007 · Cited by 220
Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so
Raihani, N. J., & Bshary, R. (2015) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/evo.12637 · Cited by 101
Societal threat as a moderator of cultural group selection
Gelfand, M. J., Roos, P., Nau, D., Harrington, J., Mu, Y., & Jackson, J. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x15000114 · Cited by 9
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Metadata
- Authors
- Roos, P., Gelfand, M., Nau, D., & Carr, R.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2014-02-07
- Volume
- 281
- Issue
- 1776
- Pages
- 20132661
- ISSN
- 0080-4649 (ISSN-L)
- 0962-8452
- 1471-2954
- OpenAlex
- W2152541003
- Cited by
- 60
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 18.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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