Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In consciousness research, it is common to distinguish between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Recently, a number of scientists have attempted to show that phenomenal content can be empirically separated from cognitive access and, accordingly, that the mental content that is accessed is not (always) identical to the content that is experienced. One notable position is that of Ned Block who suggests that phenomenal content overflows cognitive access. I will review the evidence and show that existing data, in fact, do not demonstrate overflow. I will further argue that overflow is theoretically possible—yet highly difficult to empirically demonstrate—under the condition that ‘cognitive access’ is defined as working memory or attention. However, if ‘access’ is defined as information becoming ‘cognitively available’, in a broader sense, I will argue that a separation between subjective experience and access is impossible. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access’.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The information available in brief visual presentations
Sperling, G. (1960) · Psychological Monographs: General and Applied · doi:10.1037/h0093759 · Cited by 4,042
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364
Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems
Koch, C., Massimini, M., Boly, M., & Tononi, G. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.22 · Cited by 1,600
Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
Simons, D. J., & Levin, D. T. (1997) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(97)01080-2 · Cited by 1,039
No-Report Paradigms: Extracting the True Neural Correlates of Consciousness
Tsuchiya, N., Wilke, M., Frässle, S., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2015) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.002 · Cited by 551
Consciousness cannot be separated from function
Cohen, M. A., & Dennett, D. C. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.06.008 · Cited by 542
Causal role of prefrontal cortex in the threshold for access to consciousness
Del Cul, A., Dehaene, S., Reyes, P., Bravo, E., & Slachevsky, A. (2009) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awp111 · Cited by 337
Cited by
Northoff, G., & Lamme, V. (2020) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.07.019 · Cited by 247
The search for invertebrate consciousness
Birch, J. (2022) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12351 · Cited by 254
“This is the territory of the long-running “overflow” debate (see Overgaard, 2018; Phillips, 2018 for critical reviews of recent work).”
A voice without a mouth no more: The neurobiology of language and consciousness
Skipper, J. I. (2022) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104772 · Cited by 31
“As others argue, it is hard to separate phenomenal from access consciousness in this model as they are likely highly correlated if not inseparable (Baars, 1995; Cohen and Dennett, 2011; Overgaard, 2018).”
Lacalli, T. (2025) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1648930 · Cited by 1
“Rather than the usual distinction made here, between phenomenal and access consciousness, which can be problematic (Overgaard, 2018), I prefer to distinguish between contents that cannot be deconstructed or analyzed and those that can.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Overgaard, M.
- Venue
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2018-07-30
- Volume
- 373
- Issue
- 1755
- Pages
- 20170353
- ISSN
- 0962-8436 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-2970
- OpenAlex
- W2883241463
- Cited by
- 60
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 8.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.