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A Review of Recent Advances, Challenges, and Opportunities in Malicious Insider Threat Detection Using Machine Learning Methods

Open access
Alzaabi, Fatima Rashed, Mehmood, Abid · 2024 · IEEE Access

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 94 of the 94 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 11 of the 70 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Insider threat detection has become a paramount concern in modern times where organizations strive to safeguard their sensitive information and critical assets from malicious actions by individuals with privileged access. This survey paper provides a comprehensive overview of insider threat detection, highlighting its significance in the current landscape of cybersecurity.

Overview

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TL;DR

This is a survey of malicious insider threat detection using machine learning, deep learning, and NLP, with emphasis on recent methods, datasets, metrics, challenges, and future directions. It argues that learning-based approaches are promising but still limited by data scarcity, interpretability, class imbalance, and real-world deployment constraints.

Key findings

  • The paper states that insider threats were responsible for 35% of data breaches in the 2023 Verizon DBIR, that malicious insider threats can inflict 20 times greater damage than external actors, and that the average cost is $4.5 million per breach.
  • It identifies four major categories of insider threats: malicious, accidental, fraudulent, and privileged vs. non-privileged, and also discusses duration as another categorization dimension.
  • The review says machine learning and deep learning methods have shown promise for insider threat detection, especially behavior-based, anomaly-based, and graph-based approaches; it also highlights the growing use of RNNs, LSTMs, CNNs, GNNs, autoencoders, and NLP.
  • The paper notes recurring practical issues: false positives, false negatives, class imbalance, need for large labeled datasets, interpretability problems, and adversarial attacks.

Methods

  • This is a narrative review/survey paper rather than an empirical study; it synthesizes prior work on insider threat detection.
  • It reviews and compares prior studies, datasets, techniques, and metrics, including examples such as CERT, TWOS, RUU, and Sentiment140, and summarizes methods in Tables 1–4.
  • The paper’s main analysis is a structured taxonomy covering threat types, detection approaches, data sources/features, learning-based techniques, evaluation metrics, challenges, and future trends.

Limitations

  • The paper states that the field is limited by data scarcity, model interpretability, and adversarial attacks, and calls for explainable AI, hybrid models, and more benchmark datasets.
  • It also states that many methods depend on large labeled datasets or otherwise struggle with false positives and class imbalance.
  • Evident from the text: because this is a survey, it does not report a new experiment or unified benchmark result of its own; instead it compiles and summarizes results from prior studies.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/access.2024.3369906

Cites

94 of 94 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Claims the paper makes

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Self-check

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Citations

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Metadata

Authors
Alzaabi, F. R., & Mehmood, A.
Affiliations
Abu Dhabi University (AE)
Venue
IEEE Access
Published
2024
Volume
12
Pages
30907-30927
ISSN
2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4392151675
Cited by
204
References
94
Citations by year
2026: 83 · 2025: 95 · 2024: 26
FWCI
76.36
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
  • Abu Dhabi University’s Office of Research and Grant Programs
  • Abu Dhabi University’s office of sponsored programs in the United Emirates funded this endeavor (19300752)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
Keywords
insider threat detection, malicious insiders, privileged access, deep learning, natural language processing, large language models, time series analysis, temporal patterns, human behavior analysis, cybersecurity, information security

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.