A Survey of Man In The Middle Attacks
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 183 of the 193 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack is one of the most well known attacks in computer security, representing one of the biggest concerns for security professionals. MITM targets the actual data that flows between endpoints, and the confidentiality and integrity of the data itself. In this paper, we extensively review the literature on MITM to analyse and categorize the scope of MITM attacks, considering both a reference model, such as the open systems interconnection (OSI) model, as well as two specific widely used network technologies, i.e., GSM and UMTS. In particular, we classify MITM attacks based on several parameters, like location of an attacker in the network, nature of a communication channel, and impersonation techniques. Based on an impersonation techniques classification, we then provide execution steps for each MITM class. We survey existing countermeasures and discuss the comparison among them. Finally, based on our analysis, we propose a categorisation of MITM prevention mechanisms, and we identify some possible directions for future research.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“According to (Conti et al., 2016), a MitM attacker in Wi-Fi networks can eavesdrop on the wireless communication between two end devices and, in some cases, can even actively manipulate the data flow.”
From Multi-Channel Man-in-the-Middle attacks against protected Wi-Fi networks: A state of the art review (2022) · cites this paper as Conti et al., 2016
Citations
Cites
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
Boneh, D., & Franklin, M. (2001) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-44647-8_13 · Cited by 7,060 · cited 1×
“S-DNS [83] is a proposal that is based on Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [99] key management scheme.”
MethodPassword authentication with insecure communication
Lamport, L. (1981) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/358790.358797 · Cited by 2,789 · cited 1×
“To authenticate client to the untrusted server, solution uses Lamport Hashes [67] (one time password system), which enhances security significantly in comparison to S-ARP.”
MethodBorder Gateway Protocol 3 (BGP-3)
Lougheed, K., & Rekhter, Y. (1991) · doi:10.17487/rfc1267 · Cited by 1,977
Encrypted key exchange: password-based protocols secure against dictionary attacks
Bellovin, S. M., & Merritt, M. (2003) · Proceedings 1992 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/risp.1992.213269 · Cited by 1,353
Ferguson, P., & Senie, D. (2000) · doi:10.17487/rfc2827 · Cited by 1,313
A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)
Rekhter, Y., & Li, T. (1995) · doi:10.17487/rfc1771 · Cited by 892 · cited 1×
“This information is sufficient to construct a graph of AS connectivity from which routing loops may be pruned, and some policy decisions at the AS level may be enforced [160].”
BackgroundDNS Security Introduction and Requirements
Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., & Rose, S. (2005) · doi:10.17487/rfc4033 · Cited by 685 · cited 1×
“DNS Security extensions (DNSSEC) [93] addresses the cache poisoning vulnerability in DNS.”
BackgroundSecure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP)
Kent, S., Lynn, C., & Seo, K. (2000) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · doi:10.1109/49.839934 · Cited by 645 · cited 1×
“Kent et al. [179] performed one of the major studies of domain routing security, and proposed first cryptographic solu-tion named secure BGP (sBGP).”
BackgroundPark, K., & Lee, H. (2001) · Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications · doi:10.1145/383059.383061 · Cited by 572 · cited 1×
“1) Router-Based Solutions: Distributed Packet Filtering (DPF) [122] is a method that filters packets based on the binding between prefix/flow and interface.”
MethodPi: a path identification mechanism to defend against DDoS attacks
Yaar, A., Perrig, A., & Song, D. (2004) · Proceedings 19th International Conference on Data Engineering (Cat. No.03CH37405) · doi:10.1109/secpri.2003.1199330 · Cited by 415 · cited 1×
“3) Host and Router Based Solutions: Stack Path identifier (Pi) [130] is a reactive scheme, where each router uses IP identification field for marking.”
BackgroundThe most dangerous code in the world: validating SSL certificates in non-browser software
Georgiev, M., Iyengar, S., Jana, S., Anubhai, R., Boneh, D., & Shmatikov, V. (2012) · Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/2382196.2382204 · Cited by 413 · cited 1×
“Georgiev et al. [138] presented an in-depth study of SSL connection authentication in non-browser software, and concluded that SSL certificate validation is completely broken in many critical software applications and libraries.”
BackgroundDefense Against Spoofed IP Traffic Using Hop-Count Filtering
Wang, H., Jin, C., & Shin, K. G. (2007) · IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking · doi:10.1109/tnet.2006.890133 · Cited by 374 · cited 1×
“2) Host-Based Solutions: Hop Count Filtering (HCF) [128] checks the validation of source prefix based on the binding between prefix and hop count value.”
MethodCrying Wolf: An Empirical Study of SSL Warning Effectiveness
Sunshine, J., Egelman, S., Almuhimedi, H., Atri, N., & Cranor, L. F. (2018) · KiltHub Repository · doi:10.1184/r1/6621806 · Cited by 331
The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA
Hoffman, P., & Schlyter, J. (2012) · doi:10.17487/rfc6698 · Cited by 279 · cited 1×
“In practice, the DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) protocol was implemented [149].”
MethodIngress Filtering for Multihomed Networks
Baker, F., & Savola, P. (2004) · doi:10.17487/rfc3704 · Cited by 269 · cited 1×
“in more details in Best Current Practices (BCPs) [117], and [118].”
BackgroundAccountable internet protocol (aip)
Andersen, D. G., Balakrishnan, H., Feamster, N., Koponen, T., Moon, D., & Shenker, S. (2008) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · doi:10.1145/1402946.1402997 · Cited by 262
SAVE: source address validity enforcement protocol
Li, J., Mirkovic, J., Wang, M., Reiher, P., & Zhang, L. (2003) · Proceedings.Twenty-First Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies · doi:10.1109/infcom.2002.1019407 · Cited by 255 · cited 1×
“Source Address Validation Enforcement (SAVE) [124] is a new protocol for networks, which propagates valid network prefixes along the same paths that data packets will follow.”
BackgroundInstant Ciphertext-Only Cryptanalysis of GSM Encrypted Communication
Barkan, E., Biham, E., & Keller, N. (2003) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_35 · Cited by 244
PHAS: a prefix hijack alert system
Lad, M., Massey, D., Pei, D., Wu, Y., Zhang, B., & Zhang, L. (2006) · Cited by 239
Perspectives: Improving SSH-style Host Authentication with Multi-Path Probing
Wendlandt, D., Andersen, D. G., & Perrig, A. (2018) · doi:10.1184/r1/6608366 · Cited by 236
A study of prefix hijacking and interception in the internet
Ballani, H., Francis, P., & Zhang, X. (2007) · Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications · doi:10.1145/1282380.1282411 · Cited by 224 · cited 1×
“IP hijacking occurs when a compromised or misconfigured BGP speaker announces to its peers that its AS can reach more spe-cific routes (long network prefixes) [164].”
BackgroundSoK: SSL and HTTPS: Revisiting Past Challenges and Evaluating Certificate Trust Model Enhancements
Clark, J., & van Oorschot, P. C. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.41 · Cited by 224 · cited 3×
“Clark et al. [11] carried out one of the most significant surveys of defence against SSL/TLS MITM attack.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialBGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis
Murphy, S. (2006) · doi:10.17487/rfc4272 · Cited by 217 · cited 1×
“According to [161], BGP does not provide protection against MITM attacks, because it does not perform peer entity authentication.”
BackgroundListen and whisper: security mechanisms for BGP
Subramanian, L., Röth, V., Stoica, I. G., Shenker, S. J., & Katz, R. H. (2004) · Cited by 216
Park, K., & Lee, H. (2001) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · doi:10.1145/964723.383061 · Cited by 207
A man-in-the-middle attack on UMTS
Meyer, U., & Wetzel, S. (2004) · Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Wireless security · doi:10.1145/1023646.1023662 · Cited by 206 · cited 2×
“Meyer et al. [214] stated that the mutual authentication and the data integrity of signalling messages in radio interface are the keys for protection against MITM attack.”
BackgroundHTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)
Hodges, J., Jackson, C., & Barth, A. (2012) · doi:10.17487/rfc6797 · Cited by 198 · cited 1×
“Similar solution is HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) [155], a proposal which allows websites to instruct browsers to make SSL/TLS connections mandatory on their sites.”
MethodPublic Key Pinning Extension for HTTP
Evans, C., Palmer, C., & Sleevi, R. (2015) · doi:10.17487/rfc7469 · Cited by 185 · cited 1×
“In [12], [146], [147] papers researchers offered various implementation.”
BackgroundPretty Good BGP: Improving BGP by Cautiously Adopting Routes
Karlin, J., Forrest, S., & Rexford, J. (2006) · Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols · doi:10.1109/icnp.2006.320179 · Cited by 183 · cited 1×
“Pretty Good BGP (PGBGP) [178] is non-cryptographic technique, which can mitigate BGPs most critical vulnerabilities.”
BackgroundS-ARP: a secure address resolution protocol
Bruschi, D., Ornaghi, A., & Rosti, E. (2004) · 19th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2003. Proceedings. · doi:10.1109/csac.2003.1254311 · Cited by 178 · cited 2×
“However, Antidote cannot prevent spoofing for a new IP addresses if a malicious ARP Reply arrives first [45].”
Background(2017) · doi:10.17487/rfc8205 · Cited by 173 · cited 1×
“proposed a PKI-based mechanism named BGP Security (BGPSEC) [184], which is still under development.”
BackgroundAccurate Real-time Identification of IP Prefix Hijacking
Hu, X., & Mao, Z. M. (2007) · 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) · doi:10.1109/sp.2007.7 · Cited by 172 · cited 1×
“[176] introduced real-time method, which includes both control-plane and data-plane approaches.”
MethodBremler-Barr, A., & Levy, H. (2005) · Proceedings IEEE 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. · doi:10.1109/infcom.2005.1497921 · Cited by 162 · cited 1×
“Spoofing Prevention Method (SPM) [127] is a mechanism, which inserts AS tag into data packet, and validates the bindings between address prefix and AS tag at the destination AS.”
MethodPassport: Secure and Adoptable Source Authentication
Liu, X., Li, A., Yang, X., & Wetherall, D. J. (2008) · Cited by 157
The Hitchhiker’s Guide to DNS Cache Poisoning
Son, S., & Shmatikov, V. (2010) · Lecture notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-16161-2_27 · Cited by 153 · cited 1×
“Oneof the most prominent and dangerous attacks against DNS is DNS spoofing [73], which is executed via cache poisoning (DNS spoofing quite often named as DNS poisoning).”
BackgroundAnalyzing Forged SSL Certificates in the Wild
Huang, L. S., Rice, A., Ellingsen, E., & Jackson, C. (2014) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2014.13 · Cited by 152 · cited 3×
“Huang et al. [13] presented the first analysis of forged SSL certifi-cates in the wild, which gave statistics about real usage of forged certificates.”
BackgroundInfluentialDesmedt, Y. (2006) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/0-387-23483-7_241 · Cited by 142
Certified Lies: Detecting and Defeating Government Interception Attacks against SSL (Short Paper)
Soghoian, C., & Stamm, S. (2012) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-27576-0_20 · Cited by 135 · cited 2×
“Soghoian et al. [139] based on weaknesses of X.509 PKI described compelled certificate creation attack.”
BackgroundMethodA light-weight distributed scheme for detecting ip prefix hijacks in real-time
Zheng, C., Ji, L., Pei, D., Wang, J., & Francis, P. (2007) · ACM SIGCOMM Conference (SIGCOMM) · doi:10.1145/1282380.1282412 · Cited by 130
CoDNS: improving DNS performance and reliability via cooperative lookups
Park, K., Pai, V. S., Peterson, L., & Wang, Z. (2004) · Operating Systems Design and Implementation · Cited by 128
A study of prefix hijacking and interception in the internet
Ballani, H., Francis, P., & Zhang, X. (2007) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · doi:10.1145/1282427.1282411 · Cited by 128
Security vulnerabilities in DNS and DNSSEC
Ariyapperuma, S., & Mitchell, C. J. (2007) · International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) · doi:10.1109/ares.2007.139 · Cited by 123 · cited 1×
“By checking the signature, a DNSSEC resolver is able to validate if the information originated from a legitimate server, and if it identical to the data on the authoritative DNS server [95].”
BackgroundIncreased DNS forgery resistance through 0x20-bit encoding: security via leet queries
Dagon, D., Antonakakis, M., Vixie, P., Jinmei, T., & Lee, W. (2008) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/1455770.1455798 · Cited by 121 · cited 1×
“During the last years several proposals have been published, the most notably: Source Port Randomisation (SPR) [85], source/destination IP address Randomisation (IPR), DNS 0x20 encoding [86], WSEC-DNS [87], DNS-cookies [88].”
BackgroundAn Analysis on the Schemes for Detecting and Preventing ARP Cache Poisoning Attacks
Abad, C. L., & Bonilla, R. I. (2007) · IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCSW) · doi:10.1109/icdcsw.2007.19 · Cited by 121 · cited 2×
“Abad et al. [22] carried out one of the most significant ARP security surveys.”
BackgroundOn interdomain routing security and pretty secure BGP (psBGP)
van Oorschot, P. C., Wan, T., & Kranakis, E. (2007) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/1266977.1266980 · Cited by 118 · cited 1×
“Prettysecure BGP (psBGP) [182] is another update to sBGP. Protocol introduces the notion of usage the reputation scheme in place of a hierarchical address PKI (Huston et al. [169] discussed infeasibility of hierarchical PKI for addresses).”
BackgroundSecret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)
Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D., & Wellington, B. (2000) · doi:10.17487/rfc2845 · Cited by 114 · cited 1×
“TSIG [90] is a cryptographic solution that involves authentication based on shared secret keys installed at both endpoints (requester and server), and one way hashing.”
BackgroundSecuring BGP — A Literature Survey
Huston, G., Rossi, M., & Armitage, G. J. (2010) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/surv.2011.041010.00041 · Cited by 113 · cited 3×
“Prettysecure BGP (psBGP) [182] is another update to sBGP. Protocol introduces the notion of usage the reputation scheme in place of a hierarchical address PKI (Huston et al. [169] discussed infeasibility of hierarchical PKI for addresses).”
BackgroundMethodDetecting prefix hijackings in the internet with argus
Shi, X., Xiang, Y., Wang, Z., Yin, X., & Wu, J. (2012) · ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) · doi:10.1145/2398776.2398779 · Cited by 109 · cited 3×
“[171] divided approaches on: cryptographic-based prevention,”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSecret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)
Dupont, F., Morris, S., Vixie, P., Eastlake, D., Gudmundsson, O., & Wellington, B. (2020) · doi:10.17487/rfc8945 · Cited by 107
Detecting ARP Spoofing: An Active Technique
Ramachandran, V., & Nandi, S. (2005) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/11593980_18 · Cited by 106 · cited 3×
“Some papers [18]–[29], describe spoofing as the first step or one of steps for the execution of a MITM attack.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialYang, Y., Pranggono, B., Littler, T., Yao, Z. Q., Im, E. G., McLaughlin, K., Wang, H. F., & Sezer, S. (2012) · International Conference on Sustainable Power Generation and Supply · doi:10.1049/cp.2012.1831 · Cited by 105 · cited 1×
“A number of papers [27], [28], [30], [34], [38], [44]”
BackgroundEnhanced ARP: preventing ARP poisoning-based man-in-the-middle attacks
Nam, S. Y., Kim, D., & Kim, J. (2010) · IEEE Communications Letters · doi:10.1109/lcomm.2010.02.092108 · Cited by 103 · cited 1×
“3) Voting-Based Solutions: Nam et al. [35] proposed MR-ARP, which is the first voting-based ARP spoofing resistant protocol.”
Ispy: detecting ip prefix hijacking on my own
Zhang, Z., Zhang, Y., Hu, Y., Mao, Z. M., & Bush, R. (2008) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · doi:10.1145/1402946.1402996 · Cited by 101
Topology-Based Detection of Anomalous BGP Messages
Kruegel, C., Mutz, D., Robertson, W., & Valeur, F. (2003) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-45248-5_2 · Cited by 96 · cited 1×
“Topology [173] is an IP hijacking detection algorithm that finds invalid AS path contained in BGP Update messages that do not exist in AS topology of the Internet.”
BackgroundA secure address resolution protocol
Gouda, M. G., & Huang, C. (2003) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/s1389-1286(02)00326-2 · Cited by 96 · cited 2×
“Kwon et al. [51] proposed similar to Gouda et al. [46] approach.”
BackgroundResultOn the state of IP spoofing defense
Ehrenkranz, T., & Li, J. (2009) · ACM Transactions on Internet Technology · doi:10.1145/1516539.1516541 · Cited by 94 · cited 1×
“In [120], [121], researchers divided prevention mechanisms based on the location: host-based, router-based, and based on both hosts and”
BackgroundConstructing Inter-Domain Packet Filters to Control IP Spoofing Based on BGP Updates
Duan, Z., Yuan, X., & Chandrashekar, J. (2006) · IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM) · doi:10.1109/infocom.2006.128 · Cited by 88 · cited 1×
“Inter-Domain Packet Filter (IDPF) [123] is an extension of the DPF concept.”
BackgroundTARP: Ticket-based address resolution protocol
Lootah, W., Enck, W., & McDaniel, P. D. (2007) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2007.05.007 · Cited by 80 · cited 1×
“Lootah et al. [24] introduced another method T-ARP to reduce the computational cost of S-ARP by employing the concept of tickets (centrally generated (IP, MAC) address mapping attestation).”
MethodDifferent flavours of Man-In-The-Middle attack, consequences and feasible solutions
Nayak, G. N., & Samaddar, S. G. (2010) · IEEE International Conference on Computer Science and Information Technology · doi:10.1109/iccsit.2010.5563900 · Cited by 73 · cited 3×
“Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/COMST.2016.2548426 The name Man-In-The-Middle is derived from the basket-ball scenario where two players intend to pass a ball to each other, while one player between them tries to seize it [1].”
BackgroundInfluentialDoubleCheck: Multi-path verification against man-in-the-middle attacks
Alicherry, M., & Keromytis, A. D. (2009) · IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC) · doi:10.1109/iscc.2009.5202224 · Cited by 73 · cited 1×
“Another schemes are DoubleCheck [152] and The DetecTor Project [153].”
BackgroundSSL/TLS session-aware user authentication – Or how to effectively thwart the man-in-the-middle
Oppliger, R., Hauser, R. C., & Basin, D. (2006) · Computer Communications · doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2006.03.004 · Cited by 71 · cited 1×
“Both SSL and TLS have a lot in common, as a result, in some papers [133]–[135] researchers use SSL and TLS terms interchangeably.”
BackgroundSolutions to the GSM Security Weaknesses
Toorani, M., Shirazi, A. A. B., & Shirazi, B. (2008) · Cited by 71
Meyer, U., & Wetzel, S. (2005) · IEEE International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC) · doi:10.1109/pimrc.2004.1368846 · Cited by 70 · cited 1×
“FBS-based MITM on combined GSM/UTMS network is directed on UMTS sub-scriber, and may be executed only while victim uses GSM [217].”
BackgroundToward Incentivizing Anti-Spoofing Deployment
Liu, B., Bi, J., & Vasilakos, A. V. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2013.2296437 · Cited by 69 · cited 1×
“ACL contains a set of rules, based on which packets will be filtered [116]. uRPF reversely uses the forwarding table for filtering.”
BackgroundEstablishing wireless robust security networks: a guide to IEEE 802.11i
Frankel, S. E., Eydt, B., Owens, L., & Scarfone, K. A. (2007) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-97 · Cited by 68 · cited 1×
“Frankel et al. [6] described MITM attack as one of the major threats against network security.”
BackgroundTrust No One Else: Detecting MITM Attacks against SSL/TLS without Third-Parties
Dacosta, I., Ahamad, M., & Traynor, P. (2012) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1_12 · Cited by 66 · cited 1×
“Dacosta et al. [141], researchers surveyed both sides of the third-party solutions.”
BackgroundOrigin-bound certificates: a fresh approach to strong client authentication for the web
Dietz, M., Czeskis, A., Balfanz, D., & Wallach, D. S. (2012) · USENIX Security Symposium · Cited by 65
WSEC DNS: Protecting recursive DNS resolvers from poisoning attacks
Perdisci, R., Antonakakis, M., Luo, X., & Lee, W. (2009) · International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks/Proceedings · doi:10.1109/dsn.2009.5270363 · Cited by 64 · cited 1×
“During the last years several proposals have been published, the most notably: Source Port Randomisation (SPR) [85], source/destination IP address Randomisation (IPR), DNS 0x20 encoding [86], WSEC-DNS [87], DNS-cookies [88].”
BackgroundMan-In-The-Middle attacks on bluetooth: a comparative analysis, a novel attack, and countermeasures
Haataja, K., & Hyppönen, K. (2008) · International Symposium on Communications, Control and Signal Processing · doi:10.1109/isccsp.2008.4537388 · Cited by 63 · cited 1×
“Efforts have been done to describe the problem within one specific protocol, like MITM attacks on Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [7], or within a specific technology like Bluetooth [8].”
BackgroundBULLETPROOF WIRELESS SECURITY: GSM, UMTS, 802.11, and Ad Hoc Security (Communications Engineering)
Chandra, P. (2005) · Cited by 60
X.509 Forensics: Detecting and Localising the SSL/TLS Men-in-the-Middle
Holz, R., Riedmaier, T., Kammenhuber, N., & Carle, G. (2012) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1_13 · Cited by 58 · cited 1×
“EFF SSL Observatory [144], or Crossbear [145] proposals actively scan the Internet either by querying the TLS-enabled servers or asking users to submit the certifi-cates that they see.”
BackgroundA light-weight distributed scheme for detecting ip prefix hijacks in real-time
Zheng, C., Ji, L., Pei, D., Wang, J., & Francis, P. (2007) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · doi:10.1145/1282427.1282412 · Cited by 58
Towards detecting BGP route hijacking using the RPKI
Wählisch, M., Maennel, O., & Schmidt, T. C. (2012) · ACM SIGCOMM Conference (SIGCOMM) · doi:10.1145/2342356.2342381 · Cited by 57
On the effective prevention of TLS man-in-the-middle attacks in web applications
Karapanos, N., & Čapkun, S. (2014) · USENIX Security Symposium · Cited by 55
An Efficient Solution to the ARP Cache Poisoning Problem
Goyal, V., & Tripathy, R. (2005) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/11506157_4 · Cited by 54 · cited 1×
“Goyal et al. [20] presented enhanced S-ARP with lower computational cost.”
BackgroundA Centralized Monitoring Infrastructure for Improving DNS Security
Antonakakis, M., Dagon, D., Luo, X., Perdisci, R., Lee, W., & Bellmor, J. (2010) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15512-3_2 · Cited by 51 · cited 1×
“1) Detection of DNS Spoofing: Anax [80] is a real-time solution that uses machine learning techniques.”
MethodBulletproof Wireless Security: GSM, UMTS, 802.11, and Ad Hoc Security
Chandra, P. (2005) · Cited by 50
Efficient authentication protocols of GSM
Chang, C., Lee, J.-S., & Chang, Y. (2005) · Computer Communications · doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2005.01.015 · Cited by 50 · cited 1×
“Chang et al. [195] improved such solution, in a way that mutual authentication is carried out for every communication.”
BackgroundTripunitara, M., & Dutta, P. (2003) · Annual Computer Security Applications Conference · doi:10.1109/csac.1999.816040 · Cited by 50 · cited 1×
“6) Host-Based Solutions: Tripunitara et al. [70] proposed a middleware host-based approach of asynchronous detection and prevention of ARP spoofing attacks.”
BackgroundDomain Name System (DNS) Cookies
Eastlake, D., & Andrews, M. (2016) · doi:10.17487/rfc7873 · Cited by 49 · cited 1×
“During the last years several proposals have been published, the most notably: Source Port Randomisation (SPR) [85], source/destination IP address Randomisation (IPR), DNS 0x20 encoding [86], WSEC-DNS [87], DNS-cookies [88].”
BackgroundTowards detecting BGP route hijacking using the RPKI
Wählisch, M., Maennel, O., & Schmidt, T. C. (2012) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · doi:10.1145/2377677.2377702 · Cited by 49 · cited 1×
“Another cryptographic solution is Resource Publication Infrastructure (RPKI) [183], but the proposed method for BGP origin validation is not intended to secure the routing system against attackers, who are faking their origin AS. Lepinski et al. proposed a PKI-based mechanism named BGP Security…”
MethodS-AKA: A Provable and Secure Authentication Key Agreement Protocol for UMTS Networks
Huang, Y., Shen, C.-Y., & Shieh, S. W. (2011) · IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology · doi:10.1109/tvt.2011.2168247 · Cited by 48 · cited 1×
“S-AKA [221] is a new authentication and key agreement mechanism, which is protected against redirection, MITM and DoS attacks.”
BackgroundDoX: A Peer-to-Peer Antidote for DNS Cache Poisoning Attacks
Yuan, L., Kant, K., Mohapatra, P., & Chuah, C. (2006) · International Conference on Communications · doi:10.1109/icc.2006.255120 · Cited by 48 · cited 1×
“Another approach is DoX [21], where cache updating is based on the trust between resolvers.”
BackgroundSolutions to the GSM Security Weaknesses
Toorani, M., & Beheshti, A. (2008) · International Conference on Next Generation Mobile Applications, Services and Technologies (NGMAST) · doi:10.1109/ngmast.2008.88 · Cited by 47 · cited 2×
“Later, Toorani et al. [198] showed that A3 and A8 algorithms, which are part of GSM standard, are also crackable.”
BackgroundBASE: an incrementally deployable mechanism for viable IP spoofing prevention
Lee, H., Kwon, M., Hasker, G., & Perrig, A. (2007) · ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS) · doi:10.1145/1229285.1229293 · Cited by 46 · cited 1×
“BGP Anti Spoofing Extension (BASE) [125] is a combination of marking and filter-ing approach, which is based on BGP Update messages.”
MethodDeMillo, & Merritt (1983) · Computer · doi:10.1109/mc.1983.1654298 · Cited by 44 · cited 1×
“in [2] with reference to [3].”
The detection and prevention for ARP Spoofing based on Snort
Hou, X., Jiang, Z., & Tian, X. (2010) · International Conference on Computer Application and System Modeling · doi:10.1109/iccasm.2010.5619113 · Cited by 44 · cited 2×
“[61] proposed similar approach, in which they added inspection module, and developed Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Snort.”
BackgroundMethodTrust Assertions for Certificate Keys
Marlinspike, M. (2013) · Cited by 44
Formal Analysis of the Kaminsky DNS Cache-Poisoning Attack Using Probabilistic Model Checking
Αλεξίου, Ν., Basagiannis, S., Katsaros, P., Dashpande, T., & Smolka, S. A. (2010) · IEEE International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering (HASE) · doi:10.1109/hase.2010.25 · Cited by 40 · cited 1×
“DNS is a hierarchical naming system for the Internet based on an underlying client-server architecture [72].”
BackgroundDNS Request and Transaction Signatures ( SIG(0)s )
Eastlake, R. D. (2000) · Cited by 39
ConfiDNS: leveraging scale and history to improve DNS security
Poole, L., & Pai, V. S. (2006) · Cited by 39
Preventing ARP cache poisoning attacks: A proof of concept using OpenWrt
Ortega, A. P., Marcos, X., Chiang, L., & Abad, C. L. (2009) · Latin American Network Operations and Management Symposium · doi:10.1109/lanoms.2009.5338799 · Cited by 37 · cited 2×
“ARP is crucial in LAN communications, because each frame that leaves a host must contain a destination MAC address [25].”
BackgroundMethodMITHYS: Mind The Hand You Shake - Protecting Mobile Devices from SSL Usage Vulnerabilities
Conti, M., Dragoni, N., & Gottardo, S. (2013) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-41098-7_5 · Cited by 36
Self-citationMitigation of DHCP starvation attack
Mukhtar, H., Salah, K., & Iraqi, Y. (2012) · Computers & Electrical Engineering · doi:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2012.06.005 · Cited by 35 · cited 1×
“Another option is to run DHCP starvation attack (when attacker exhausts the allocated pool of IP addresses offered by the valid DHCP server, so that new host machines fail to obtain IP addresses [101]).”
BackgroundCollaborative approach to mitigating ARP poisoning-based Man-in-the-Middle attacks
Nam, S. Y., Djuraev, S., & Park, M. (2013) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2013.09.011 · Cited by 35 · cited 2×
“However, in [34]–[40] authors define spoofing-based MITM attack as a spoofing attack, which leads to the MITM attack.”
BackgroundMethodPublic-key infrastructure for the Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP)
Seo, K., Lynn, C., & Kent, S. (2002) · DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition · doi:10.1109/discex.2001.932219 · Cited by 35 · cited 2×
“To achieve this, sBGP uses digital signatures, X.509 certificates and PKIs (so-called basic security framework) [180].”
BackgroundMethodNIS04-4: Man in the Middle Intrusion Detection
Trabelsi, Z., & Shuaib, K. (2006) · Globecom · doi:10.1109/glocom.2006.282 · Cited by 34 · cited 1×
“Later, Trabelsi et al. [64] improved their approach.”
BackgroundStragglers of the herd get eaten: security concerns for GSM mobile banking applications
Paik, M. (2010) · IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications (WMCSA) · doi:10.1145/1734583.1734597 · Cited by 34 · cited 2×
“[201] besides describing GSM security concerns, pointed out that nowadays attackers are better equipped.”
BackgroundA cocktail protocol with the Authentication and Key Agreement on the UMTS
Ou, H., Hwang, M., & Jan, J. (2009) · Journal of Systems and Software · doi:10.1016/j.jss.2009.08.019 · Cited by 33 · cited 1×
“Cocktail-AKA [219] protocol is based on Authentication Vectors (AVs), in comparison to UMTS-AKA it decreases computational and communicational overheads.”
MethodDepenDNS: Dependable Mechanism against DNS Cache Poisoning
Sun, H., Chang, W.-H., Chang, S.-Y., & Lin, Y.-H. (2009) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-10433-6_12 · Cited by 33 · cited 2×
“Sun et al. [83] presented DepenDNS protocol, but Alfardan et al. [84] discovered that it does not protect against the DNS spoofing attack.”
BackgroundMethodPrivacy and authentication protocol providing anonymous channels in GSM
Peinado, A. (2004) · Computer Communications · doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2004.05.018 · Cited by 31
Modeling of Man-in-the-Middle Attack in the Wireless Networks
Chen, Z., Guo, S., Zheng, K., & Yang, Y. (2007) · International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing · doi:10.1109/wicom.2007.562 · Cited by 30 · cited 2×
“This manipulation is possible, since GSM does not provide the data integrity [205], as a result, attacker can catch, modify, and resend messages.”
BackgroundMutual Authentication and Key Agreement for GSM
Kumar, K. P. (2006) · International Conference on Mobile Business · doi:10.1109/icmb.2006.37 · Cited by 30 · cited 2×
“Based on [208], Kumar et al. [190] proposed a method which makes MS and VLR authenticate each other, and establishes a session key.”
Seven Deadliest Network Attacks
Prowell, S., Kraus, R., & Borkin, M. (2010) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/c2009-0-61914-0 · Cited by 30
Hwang, T., & Gope, P. (2013) · Wireless Personal Communications · doi:10.1007/s11277-013-1501-5 · Cited by 29 · cited 1×
“Hwang et al. [222] proposed another AKA, which is MITM resistant.”
BackgroundDesign and implementation of improved security protocols for DHCP using digital certificates
Duangphasuk, S., Kungpisdan, S., & Hankla, S. (2011) · The ... IEEE International Conference on Networks/The IEEE International Conference on Networks · doi:10.1109/icon.2011.6168490 · Cited by 29 · cited 1×
“• Each DHCP message is transmitted in a cleartext [100].”
BackgroundMitigating ARP poisoning-based man-in-the-middle attacks in wired or wireless LAN
Nam, S. Y., Jurayev, S., Kim, S.-S., Choi, K., & Choi, G. S. (2012) · EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking · doi:10.1186/1687-1499-2012-89 · Cited by 29 · cited 1×
“Name et al. tried to overcome the limitation of MR-ARP by introduction of EMR-ARP [39].”
BackgroundNew attacks on UMTS network access
Ahmadian, Z., Salimi, S., & Salahi, A. (2009) · Wireless Telecommunications Symposium · doi:10.1109/wts.2009.5068979 · Cited by 29 · cited 2×
“In [215], [218], researchers introduced a similar method, which exploits same weaknesses of GSM legacy in UMTS network, but for real-time eavesdropping, without ability to transform data.”
BackgroundMethodDNS Request and Transaction Signatures ( SIG(0)s )
Eastlake, D. E. (2000) · doi:10.17487/rfc2931 · Cited by 29 · cited 1×
“SIG(0) [91] is another proposal that uses public key authentication, where the public keys are stored in DNS as KEY Resource Records (RRs), and a private key is stored at the signer.”
BackgroundNetwork Security Management Using ARP Spoofing
Kwon, K., Ahn, S., & Chung, J. W. (2004) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24707-4_18 · Cited by 28 · cited 1×
“Kwon et al. [51] proposed similar to Gouda et al. [46] approach.”
ResultLight weight approach for IP-ARP spoofing detection and prevention
Bhirud, S. G., & Katkar, V. D. (2011) · Asian Himalayas International Conference on Internet · doi:10.1109/ahici.2011.6113951 · Cited by 28
The security of the GSM air interface protocol
Mitchell, C. J. (n.d.) · Royal Holloway Digital Repository (Royal Holloway University of London) · Cited by 28
Preventing ARP Attacks Using a Fuzzy-Based Stateful ARP Cache
Trabelsi, Z., & Hajj, W. E. (2007) · International Conference on Communications · doi:10.1109/icc.2007.228 · Cited by 27 · cited 1×
“Trabelsi et al. [23] introduced a stateful ARP cache management mechanism based on a fuzzy logic.”
Notice of Violation of IEEE Publication Principles: GSM Security Issues and Challenges
Siddique, S., & Amir, M. (2006) · ACIS International Conference on Software Engineering, Artificial Intelligence, Networking and Parallel/Distributed Computing (SNPD) · doi:10.1109/snpd-sawn.2006.42 · Cited by 26
Detecting and defeating advanced man-in-the-middle attacks against TLS
de la Hoz, E., Cochrane, G., Moreira-Lemus, J. M., Paez-Reyes, R., Marsá-Maestre, I., & Alarcos, B. (2014) · doi:10.1109/cycon.2014.6916404 · Cited by 26 · cited 5×
“In [12], authors pointed out two problems with certifi-cate pinning technique: the demand of the secure associations database maintenance, and complexity of the trust between associations.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialCLL: A Cryptographic Link Layer for Local Area Networks
Jerschow, Y. I., Lochert, C., Scheuermann, B., & Martin Mauve, A. (2008) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-85855-3_3 · Cited by 25 · cited 2×
“Figure 5 shows classification of DHCP spoofing [47].”
BackgroundReconfigurable hardware implementation of host-based IDS
Sato, T., & Fukase, M.-A. (2004) · Asia-Pacific Conference on Communications (APCC) · doi:10.1109/apcc.2003.1274480 · Cited by 25 · cited 1×
“Moreover, IDSs’ ability to detect ARP spoofing is limited [63], as they may not be able to detect all of the attack forms.”
BackgroundResearch on the Defense Against ARP Spoofing Attacks Based on Winpcap
Xing, W., Zhao, Y., & Li, T. (2010) · International Workshop on Education Technology and Computer Science · doi:10.1109/etcs.2010.75 · Cited by 25 · cited 1×
“WinPcap [54] is a library that captures and filters ARP packets.”
BackgroundMitigating denial of service threats in GSM networks
Bocan, V., & Cretu, V. I. (2006) · International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) · doi:10.1109/ares.2006.81 · Cited by 25
Song, M. S., Lee, J. D., Jeong, Y., Jeong, H., & Park, J. H. (2014) · The Scientific World JOURNAL · doi:10.1155/2014/264654 · Cited by 25 · cited 1×
“Recently, Song et al. [66] introduced a detection scheme for ARP spoofing attack by the means of a routing trace, named DS-ARP.”
BackgroundAn incrementally deployable anti-spoofing mechanism for software-defined networks
Kwon, J., Seo, D., Kwon, M., Lee, H., Perrig, A., & Kim, H. (2015) · Computer Communications · doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2015.03.003 · Cited by 24 · cited 1×
“According to [131] solution can not provide protection against spoofing, if the origin AS does not deploy it.”
BackgroundThe secure DHCP system with user authentication
Komori, T., & Saito, T. (2003) · Conference on Local Computer Networks · doi:10.1109/lcn.2002.1181774 · Cited by 24
DHCP server authentication using digital certificates
Dinu, D. D., & Togan, M. (2014) · International Conference on Communications (COMM) · doi:10.1109/iccomm.2014.6866756 · Cited by 23 · cited 1×
“Most recently, Dinu et al. [103] surveyed solutions that aim to make DHCP more secure, and presented their own approach.”
BackgroundTowards Forensic Analysis of Attacks with DNSSEC
Shulman, H., & Waidner, M. (2014) · IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) · doi:10.1109/spw.2014.20 · Cited by 23 · cited 1×
“It provides data integrity and origin authenticity via cryptographic digital signatures over DNS resource records [94].”
MethodTransport Layer Security (TLS) Channel IDs
Balfanz, D., & Hamilton, R. (2013) · Cited by 23
Security aspects of mobile communications
Vedder, K. (1993) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/3-540-57341-0_63 · Cited by 21 · cited 1×
“GSM was built with security considerations in mind, to provide the privacy and integrity of the cellular network [191].”
MethodSimple and Lightweight HTTPS Enforcement to Protect against SSL Striping Attack
Puangpronpitag, S., & Sriwiboon, N. (2012) · International Conference on Computational Intelligence, Communication Systems and Networks (CICSyN) · doi:10.1109/cicsyn.2012.50 · Cited by 21 · cited 1×
“ISAN-HTTPSEnforcer [154] uses the Javascript API to enforce redirection to HTTPS.”
MethodVASE: Filtering IP spoofing traffic with agility
Yao, G., Bi, J., & Xiao, P. (2012) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2012.08.018 · Cited by 21 · cited 1×
“[119] proposed next classification: filtering-on-path (mechanisms filter packets before they aggregated at victim network), and end-to-end authentication (mechanisms validate the”
BackgroundASA: agent-based secure ARP cache management
Oh, M., Kim, Y., Hong, S., & Cha, S. (2012) · IET Communications · doi:10.1049/iet-com.2011.0566 · Cited by 21 · cited 3×
“However, when ARP cache is managed in a dynamic mode, cache entries can be easily fabricated by forged ARP messages, since proper authentication mechanism is missing [43].”
BackgroundResultInfluentialThe GSM/UMTS Phone Number Catcher
Song, Y., Hu, X., & Lan, Z. (2011) · International Conference on Multimedia Information Networking and Security · doi:10.1109/mines.2011.153 · Cited by 20 · cited 1×
“A fake BTS system is an equipment that can act as a real BTS, it broadcasts BTS signal over the air and makes mobile phones in covered area to communicate with it [187].”
BackgroundAn efficient authentication protocol for mobile communications
Lee, C., Liao, I., & Hwang, M. (2010) · Telecommunication Systems · doi:10.1007/s11235-009-9276-4 · Cited by 20 · cited 1×
“Lee et al. [212] described GSM mutual authentication protocol, which is MITM resistant.”
BackgroundHumanized antibodies and their applications
Wu, H., & Dall’Acqua, W. F. (2005) · Methods · doi:10.1016/j.ymeth.2005.02.001 · Cited by 20
Siddiqui, M. S., Montero, D., Serral-Gracià, R., Masip‐Bruin, X., & Yannuzzi, M. (2015) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2015.01.017 · Cited by 20 · cited 1×
“DESIGN PRINCIPLES [202]”
Stealth and semi-stealth MITM attacks, detection and defense in IPv4 networks
Samineni, N. R., Barbhuiya, F. A., & Nandi, S. (2012) · International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Grid Computing (PDGC) · doi:10.1109/pdgc.2012.6449847 · Cited by 20
Security analysis of a cocktail protocol with the authentication and key agreement on the UMTS
Wu, S., Zhu, Y., & Pu, Q. (2010) · IEEE Communications Letters · doi:10.1109/lcomm.2010.04.092279 · Cited by 20 · cited 1×
“…is initiated, the SN distributes MAV, HE distributes PAV, and they produce an AV for mutual authentication with the MS. Saxena et. al [15] included Cocktail-AKA protocol to category Prevent MITM attack , but Wu et al. [220] stated that it is vulnerable to impersonation attacks, which lead to MITM.”
MethodAntidotes for DNS Poisoning by Off-Path Adversaries
Herzberg, A., & Shulman, H. (2012) · International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) · doi:10.1109/ares.2012.27 · Cited by 19 · cited 1×
“Herzberg et al. [79] performed a critical study of the prominent defence mechanisms against DNS spoofing, and proposed taxonomy of them.”
BackgroundA low-cost embedded IDS to monitor and prevent Man-in-the-Middle attacks on wired LAN environments
Belenguer, J., & Calafate, C. T. (2007) · International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies · doi:10.1109/secureware.2007.4385321 · Cited by 19 · cited 1×
“Belenguer et al. [62] introduced low-cost embedded IDS, which is able to detect and prevent ARP spoofing attacks automatically and efficiently, but requires to be plugged into a switch or a hub.”
BackgroundThreats and Countermeasures in GSM Networks
Bocan, V., & Cretu, B. (2006) · Journal of Networks · doi:10.4304/jnw.1.6.18-27 · Cited by 18 · cited 1×
“However, protocol is weak against the brute force [209] and MITM [210] attacks.”
BackgroundSecure-AKA: An Efficient AKA Protocol for UMTS Networks
Saxena, N., & Chaudhari, N. S. (2014) · Wireless Personal Communications · doi:10.1007/s11277-014-1821-0 · Cited by 17 · cited 4×
“Saxena et al. [15] collected proposals, which prevent MITM attack on GSM and UMTS networks.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialA Study of Man-in-the-Middle Attack Based on SSL Certificate Interaction
Du, J., Li, X., & Huang, H. (2011) · International Conference on Instrumentation and Measurement, Computer, Communication and Control (IMCCC) · doi:10.1109/imccc.2011.117 · Cited by 16 · cited 1×
“SSL/TLS protocols provide the main services as follows [136]: (cid:129) authenticate users and servers, to ensure that data is sent to the correct destination; (cid:129) encrypt data to prevent data filch during transmission; (cid:129) maintain data integrity during transmission to ensure data is…”
BackgroundSecuring network location awareness with authenticated DHCP
Aura, T., Roe, M., & Murdoch, S. J. (2007) · Security and Privacy in Communication Networks · doi:10.1109/seccom.2007.4550359 · Cited by 16
Real-time interception systems for the GSM protocol
González-Castaño, F. J., Vales‐Alonso, J., Pousada-Carballo, J. M., Isasi-de-Vicente, F., & Iglesias, M. J. F. (2002) · IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology · doi:10.1109/tvt.2002.801547 · Cited by 16 · cited 1×
“Many papers (for instance, [192]–[200]) have discussed key security issues in GSM.”
BackgroundDHCP Authentication Via Kerberos V
Aboba, B., Hornstein, K., Trostle, J. T., & Lemon, T. (2001) · Cited by 16
An Active Host-Based Detection Mechanism for ARP-Related Attacks
Barbhuiya, F. A., Roopa, S., Ratti, R., Hubballi, N., Biswas, S., Sur, A., Nandi, S., & Ramachandran, V. (2010) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17878-8_44 · Cited by 15 · cited 1×
“Barbhuiya et al. [65] suggested another method, which checks the integrity and authenticity of ARP Replies using a combination of digital signatures and one time passwords.”
MethodJamming system for mobile communications
Pousada-Carballo, J. M., González-Castaño, F. J., Isasi-de-Vicente, F., & Iglesias, M. J. F. (1998) · Electronics Letters · doi:10.1049/el:19981500 · Cited by 15 · cited 1×
“FBS attack may include the real-time jamming system [188], which blocks all active carries in the area.”
BackgroundThwarting Address Resolution Protocol Poisoning using Man In The Middle Attack in WLAN
Kumar, R., Verma, S., Tomar, G. S., & Indies, U. O. W. (2013) · International Journal of Reliable Information and Assurance · doi:10.21742/ijria.2013.1.1.02 · Cited by 15 · cited 1×
“A number of papers [27], [28], [30], [34], [38], [44]”
BackgroundSecurity Measures and Weaknesses of the GPRS Security Architecture
Xenakis, C. (2008) · doi:10.6633/ijns.200803.6(2).05 · Cited by 14
Securing Wireless Networks from ARP Cache Poisoning
Philip, R. (2007) · San José State University ScholarWorks (San Jose State University) · doi:10.31979/etd.fu2m-skmj · Cited by 14 · cited 1×
“Philip et al. [32] showed how to prevent ARP spoofing in wireless LAN by implementing the defence mechanism in the AP.”
BackgroundUsing JPCAP to Prevent Man-in-the-Middle Attacks in a Local Area Network Environment
Fayyaz, F., & Rasheed, H. S. (2012) · IEEE Potentials · doi:10.1109/mpot.2012.2187102 · Cited by 14 · cited 1×
“ARP is a trusted protocol and was not designed to cope with malicious hosts [41].”
BackgroundRecovering and Protecting against DNS Cache Poisoning Attacks
Yu, X., Chen, X., & Xu, F. (2011) · International Conference of Information Technology, Computer Engineering and Management Sciences · doi:10.1109/icm.2011.266 · Cited by 14 · cited 2×
“Some papers [18]–[29], describe spoofing as the first step or one of steps for the execution of a MITM attack.”
BackgroundPansa, D., & Chomsiri, T. (2008) · doi:10.1109/iccit.2008.345 · Cited by 14 · cited 1×
“Pansa and Chomsiri [52] proposed a revision of the DHCP definition.”
BackgroundAn efficient authentication protocol for GSM networks
Hwang, M., Tang, Y.-L., & Lee, C. (2002) · IEEE/AFCEA EUROCOMM Conference (EUROCOMM) · doi:10.1109/eurcom.2000.874826 · Cited by 14 · cited 2×
“Hwang et al. [208] proposed an approach which makes authentication of the VLR by MS using certificates generated by the HLR and a temporary secret key.”
MethodP-ARP: A novel enhanced authentication scheme for securing ARP
Limmaneewichid, P., & Lilakiatsakun, W. (2011) · Cited by 14
DNSSEC vs. DNSCurve: A Side-by-Side Comparison
Αναγνωστόπουλος, Μ., Kambourakis, G., Konstantinou, E., & Gritzalis, S. (2011) · IGI Global eBooks · doi:10.4018/978-1-4666-0104-8.ch012 · Cited by 14 · cited 1×
“Anagnostopoulos et al. [98] gave detailed comparison of two methods.”
ResultCache Poisoning Detection Method for Improving Security of Recursive DNS
Ju, Y. W., Song, K.-H., Lee, E. J., & Shin, Y. T. (2007) · International Conference on Advanced Communication Technology · doi:10.1109/icact.2007.358755 · Cited by 13 · cited 2×
“DNS spoofing may be categorised into [74], [75]: 1) hijacking or sniffing packets in the process of query response (between the recursive DNS and authoritative DNS); 2) cache poisoning through the birthday attack [76]; 3) hacking on authorised DNS.”
BackgroundResultDNSSEC in Practice: Using DNSSEC-Tools to Deploy DNSSEC
Krishnaswamy, S., Hardaker, W., & Mundy, R. (2009) · Cybersecurity Applications & Technology Conference for Homeland Security (CATCH) · doi:10.1109/catch.2009.21 · Cited by 13 · cited 1×
“Also, DNSSEC does not provide protection from buffer overruns, DoS attacks, nor provide confidentiality [96].”
BackgroundUnilateral Antidotes to DNS Poisoning
Herzberg, A., & Shulman, H. (2012) · Lecture notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31909-9_18 · Cited by 12 · cited 1×
“Nevertheless, production of significant extra entropy to DNS requests will not protect from the DNS spoofing, the attacker may still be able to poison high value domain names [89].”
BackgroundAn Active Intrusion Detection System for LAN Specific Attacks
Hubballi, N., Roopa, S., Ratti, R., Barbhuiya, F. A., Biswas, S., Sur, A., Nandi, S., & Ramachandran, V. (2010) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-13577-4_11 · Cited by 12 · cited 1×
“Ramachandran et al. [18], [26] proposed a scheme for detecting ARP spoofing through the mismatch of the ARP Request/Response packets and the (IP, MAC) pairs of TCP SYN.”
BackgroundDhcp Message Authentication With An Effective Key Management
Ju, H., & Han, J.-W. (2007) · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) · doi:10.5281/zenodo.1083139 · Cited by 12
Principle of and Protection of Man-in-the-middle Attack Based on ARP Spoofing
Hao, G., & Tao, G. (2009) · Journal of Information Processing Systems · doi:10.3745/jips.2009.5.3.131 · Cited by 12 · cited 2×
“However, in [34]–[40] authors define spoofing-based MITM attack as a spoofing attack, which leads to the MITM attack.”
BackgroundSecurity enhancements against UMTS–GSM interworking attacks
Ahmadian, Z., Salimi, S., & Salahi, A. (2010) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2010.01.005 · Cited by 12 · cited 1×
“In [215], [218], researchers introduced a similar method, which exploits same weaknesses of GSM legacy in UMTS network, but for real-time eavesdropping, without ability to transform data.”
MethodAlFardan, N. J., & Paterson, K. G. (2011) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-18178-8_4 · Cited by 11 · cited 1×
“Sun et al. [83] presented DepenDNS protocol, but Alfardan et al. [84] discovered that it does not protect against the DNS spoofing attack.”
BackgroundSAKA: a secure authentication and key agreement protocol for GSM networks
Saxena, N., & Chaudhari, N. S. (2013) · CSI Transactions on ICT · doi:10.1007/s40012-013-0030-4 · Cited by 11
A new mutual authentication protocol for GSM networks
Fanian, A., Berenjkoub, M., & Gulliver, T. A. (2009) · Conference proceedings - Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering · doi:10.1109/ccece.2009.5090238 · Cited by 10 · cited 1×
“Later, Fanian et al. [211] proposed a solution based on the symmetric polynomials.”
BackgroundDefense against DNS Man-In-The-Middle Spoofing
Bai, X., Hu, L. Q., Song, Z., Chen, F., & Zhao, K. (2011) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-23971-7_39 · Cited by 9 · cited 2×
“Recently, Bai et al. [37] suggested a new way of defence, which we propose to consider as a new category artificial neural networks , see Section III-D4.”
BackgroundInvestigation of DHCP Packets using Wireshark
Khan, M. S., Alshomrani, S. M., & Qamar, S. (2013) · International Journal of Computer Applications · doi:10.5120/10451-5155 · Cited by 9
A Unified Approach to Intra-domain Security
Shue, C. A., Kalafut, A. J., & Gupta, M. (2009) · doi:10.1109/cse.2009.204 · Cited by 9
A Proof of MITM Vulnerability in Public WLANs Guarded by Captive Portal
Chen, W., & Wu, Q. (2010) · Proceedings of the Asia-Pacific Advanced Network · doi:10.7125/apan.30.10 · Cited by 8 · cited 1×
“A number of papers [27], [28], [30], [34], [38], [44]”
BackgroundSHS-HTTPS enforcer: enforcing HTTPS and preventing MITM attacks
Sugavanesh, B., Hari Prasath, R., & Selvakumar, S. (2013) · ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes · doi:10.1145/2532780.2532802 · Cited by 8 · cited 1×
“The method has the same weakness as ISAN-HTTPSEnforcer - initial connection is over HTTP. Sugavanesh et al. introduced SHSHTTPS Enforcer (SHSE) [156], a local daemon, which enforces URL redirection before the request flows over the insecure protocol.”
MethodRethinking the link security approach to manage large scale Ethernet network
Wahid, K. F. (2010) · IEEE International Symposium on Local and Metropolitan Area Networks (LANMAN) · doi:10.1109/lanman.2010.5507143 · Cited by 8
Route-Leaks & MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC
McPherson, D., Osterweil, E., Amante, S., & Mitchell, D. (2014) · Cited by 8
Empirical analysis of Public Key Infrastructures and investigation of improvements
Holz, R.-G. (2014) · mediaTUM (Technical University of Munich) · Cited by 8
An Authentication Method based on Certificate for DHCP
Wong, M., Xu, Y., & Manning, S. (2011) · Cited by 8
Protecting DNS from cache poisoning attack by using secure proxy
Naqash, T., Ubaid, F. B., Ishfaq, A., & Fazal-e-Hadi (2012) · International Conference on Emerging Technologies · doi:10.1109/icet.2012.6375486 · Cited by 7 · cited 1×
“…DNS server in the network, which will produce fraud data (may lead to spreading fraud data not only to target DNS, but further to neighbour DNSs); (cid:129) send fake DNS answer right before real DNS will send valid one (by default DNS accepts first answer, and discards further automatically [77]).”
BackgroundIP prefix hijacking detection using the collection of as characteristics
Hong, S.-C., Hong, J. W., & Ju, H. (2011) · Asia-Pacific Network Operations and Management Symposium (APNOMS) · doi:10.1109/apnoms.2011.6077014 · Cited by 7 · cited 1×
“Hong et al. [166], [177] proposed network reachability-based IP hijacking detection together with fingerprinting methods.”
MethodThe Research and Implementation of ARP Monitoring and Protection
Wu, L., Yu, T., Wu, D., & Cheng, J. (2011) · International Conference on Internet Technology and Applications · doi:10.1109/itap.2011.6006145 · Cited by 7 · cited 1×
“Other papers [30]–[33] name spoofing as an equivalent of the MITM.”
BackgroundKalajdzic, K., & Patel, A. (2011) · Cited by 7
LDC: Detecting BGP Prefix Hijacking by Load Distribution Change
Liu, Y., Su, J., & Chang, R. K. C. (2012) · IEEE International Symposium on Parallel & Distributed Processing, Workshops and Phd Forum · doi:10.1109/ipdpsw.2012.147 · Cited by 6 · cited 2×
“Liux et al. [170] focused on detection methods and divided them based on timing: prevention before the attack, detection during the attack, and reaction after the attack.”
BackgroundSignatureCheck: a protocol to detect man-in-the-middle attack in SSL
Benton, K., Jo, J.-Y., & Kim, Y. (2011) · Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research Workshop · doi:10.1145/2179298.2179365 · Cited by 6 · cited 1×
“Both SSL and TLS have a lot in common, as a result, in some papers [133]–[135] researchers use SSL and TLS terms interchangeably.”
BackgroundKalajdzic, K., Patel, A. M., & Taghavi, M. (2011) · International Journal of Digital Crime and Forensics · doi:10.4018/jdcf.2011070104 · Cited by 6
Securing VoIP network: An overview of applied approaches and analysis
Oche, M., Nasir, M. K., Tambawal, A. B., & Noor, R. M. (2013) · Pan African Conference Science, Computing and Telecommunications · doi:10.1109/scat.2013.7055097 · Cited by 4 · cited 1×
“DHCP snooping blocks DHCP responses from ports that do not have DHCP servers associated with them [114].”
BackgroundNetwork reachability‐based IP prefix hijacking detection
Hong, S., Ju, H., & Hong, J. W. (2012) · International Journal of Network Management · doi:10.1002/nem.1805 · Cited by 3 · cited 4×
“AS path falsification occurs when the attacker changes a path attribute in the Update message [166].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialJung, Y., Peradilla, M. S., & Atwood, J. W. (2014) · IEICE Transactions on Communications · doi:10.1587/transcom.e97.b.1375 · Cited by 2 · cited 1×
“However, this approach would create additional overhead in wireless mesh networks, especially in large-scale, since the voting requests are issued in broadcast [69].”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 43
- thuc, 0, A Software Solution for Defending Against Man-in-the-Middle Attacks on WLAN
- white, 2003, Securing BGP through secure origin BGP (SOBGP), Bus Commun Rev, 33, 47
- sempere, 0, An Overview of the GSM System
- chiu, 0, Analysis of a man-in-the-middle experiment with Wireshark, Proc Int Conf Secur Manage (SAM’11), 461
- demuth, 2005, ARP spoofing and poisoning: Traffic tricks, Linux Mag, 56, 26
- engert, 0, Detector io
- arpdefender, 2010, What is Arpdefender Designed For?
- gmbh, 0, ARP-Guard
- bhaiji, 0, Security features on switches
- lab, 2002, Anticap Naive ARP Poisoning Mitigation
- hepner, 0, Defending against BGP man-in-the-middle attacks, Proc Black Hat DC Conf
- mizuguchi, 0, Inter-domain routing security BGP route hijacking, Proc Asia Pac Reg Internet Conf Oper Technol (APRICOT’07)
- genachowski, 0, FCC CSRIC Makes Recommendations Regarding ISP Cyber Security
- baker, 2011, Data breach investigations report, Methods, 36, 1
- 2014, Capec-94 Man in the Middle Attack
- ornaghi, 0, Man in the middle attacks, Proc Blackhat Conf Eur
- shukla, 2015, An innovative method for detection and prevention against ARP spoofing in MANET, Int J Comput Sci Inf Secur, 5
- su, 2005, STREAMS Programming Guide
- chopra, 2014, Man in the Middle (MITM) DNS Spoofing Explained
- kaminsky, 2008, It’s the end of the cache as we know it, presentation at Blackhat Briefings
- 0, arpwatch the ethernet monitor program for keeping track of ethernet/ip address pairings
- teterin, 0, ARP Spoofing Defence
- siddique, 0, GSM security issues and challenges, Proc 7th ACIS Int Conf Softw Eng Artif Intell Netw Parallel Distrib Comput, 413
- shrivastava, 2014, DNS server cryptography using symmetric key cryptography, Int J Innov Adv Comput Sci, 3, 21
- bernstein, 2009, DNSCurve Usable Security for DNS
- bernstein, 0, DNS Forgery
- luthi, 0, Improving Security of Mobile Devices
- 0, Ettus Research—The Leader in Software Defined Radio (SDR)
- 0, OpenBTS—Open Cource Cellular Infrastructure
- fanian, 0, A TESLA-based mutual authentication protocol for GSM networks, ISC Int J Inf Security, 1, 3
- ericsson, 0, Traffic and Market Report
- 0, 3G Security Security Threats and Requirements
- saxena, 0, Proc Int conf Adv Comput Sci Electron Eng (CSEE’14), 220
- prentow, 0, MITM Attacks on SSL/TLS Related to Renegotiation
- langley, 0, Certificate Transparency ImperialViolet
- 0, The ICSI Certificate Notary
- 0, The EFF SSL Observatory
- bhaiji, 2007, Understanding Preventing and Defending Against Layer 2 Attacks
- ericsson, 2014, Ericsson Mobility Report
- green, 2005, DNS spoofing by the man in the middle
- carnut, 0, ARP spoofing detection on switched Ethernet networks: A feasibility study, Proc 5th Symp Seguranca Inf
- tanase, 1674, IP Spoofing an Introduction
- patel, 2015, Various anti IP spoofing techniques, J Eng Comput Appl Sci, 4, 7
Cited by
Network Intrusion Detection for IoT Security Based on Learning Techniques
Chaabouni, N., Mosbah, M., Zemmari, A., Sauvignac, C., & Faruki, P. (2019) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2019.2896380 · Cited by 940
“a) Technical terms of the attacks: First, spoofing [34], [35] or impersonation attack sneaks authentication credentials to gain unauthorized service access.”
BackgroundIoT Privacy and Security: Challenges and Solutions
Tawalbeh, L., Muheidat, F., Tawalbeh, M., & Quwaider, M. (2020) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app10124102 · Cited by 764
“Man in the middle attack e ff ectively makes the bank server recognize the transaction being done as a valid event since the adversary does not have to know the identity of the supposed victim [15].”
BackgroundA Comprehensive Review of Cyber Security Vulnerabilities, Threats, Attacks, and Solutions
Aslan, Ö., Aktuğ, S. S., Ozkan-Okay, M., Yilmaz, A. A., & Akin, E. (2023) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics12061333 · Cited by 739
“Man-in-the-middle attack: The man-in-the-middle attack is the oldest type of cyber attack, in which a malicious person is secretly involved in communication between two parties [98].”
BackgroundIoT Elements, Layered Architectures and Security Issues: A Comprehensive Survey
Burhan, M., Rehman, R. A., Khan, B., & Kim, B.-S. (2018) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s18092796 · Cited by 518
“It causes a serious threat to online security because they give the attacker the facility to capture and manipulate information in real time [42].”
BackgroundAhmad, I., Shahabuddin, S., Kumar, T., Okwuibe, J., Gurtov, A., & Ylianttila, M. (2019) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2019.2916180 · Cited by 366
“it was possible for a false operator to impersonate the original operator and perform a man-in-the-middle attack [38].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Conti, M., Dragoni, N., & Lesyk, V.
- Affiliations
- University of Padua (IT)
- Örebro University (SE)
- Venue
- IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
- Published
- 2016
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 2027-2051
- ISSN
- 1553-877X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2320204756
- Cited by
- 724
- References
- 193
- Citations by year
- 2026: 63 · 2025: 103 · 2024: 94 · 2023: 82 · 2022: 80 · 2021: 87 · 2020: 84 · 2019: 57 · 2018: 41 · 2017: 26 · 2016: 6
- FWCI
- 40.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials (publishedVersion)
- Technical University of Denmark, DTU Orbit (Technical University of Denmark, DTU) (submittedVersion)
- Padua Research Archive (University of Padova) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Marie Curie Fellowship
- European Commission (PCIG11-GA-2012-321980)
- EU TagItSmart (H2020-ICT30-2015-688061)
- EU-India REACH (ICI+/2014/342-896)
- TENACE PRIN (20103P34XC)
- Italian MIUR
- Tackling Mobile Malware with Innovative Machine Learning Techniques
- Physical-Layer Security for Wireless Communication
- Content Centric Networking: Security and Privacy Issues
- University of Padua
- Erasmus Mundus Scholarship
- European Commission for the NordSecMob
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cybersecurity and Information Systems
- Keywords
- man-in-the-middle attacks, attack classification, GSM, UMTS, OSI model, data confidentiality, data integrity, countermeasures, mobile network security
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.