Stuxnet worm impact on industrial cyber-physical system security
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Industrial systems consider only partially security, mostly relying on the basis of “isolated” networks, and controlled access environments. Monitoring and control systems such as SCADA/DCS are responsible for managing critical infrastructures operate in these environments, where a false sense of security assumptions is usually made. The Stuxnet worm attack demonstrated widely in mid 2010 that many of the security assumptions made about the operating environment, technological capabilities and potential threat risk analysis are far away from the reality and challenges modern industrial systems face. We investigate in this work the highly sophisticated aspects of Stuxnet, the impact that it may have on existing security considerations and pose some thoughts on the next generation SCADA/DCS systems from a security perspective.
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Citations
Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Karnouskos, S.
- Venue
- IECON 2011 - 37th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2011-11
- Pages
- 4490-4494
- ISSN
- 1553-572X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2039148409
- Cited by
- 528
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 13.42
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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