Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper presents a theory of the market provision of broadcasting and uses it to address the nature of market failure in the industry. Equilibrium advertising levels may be too low or too high, depending on the nuisance cost to viewers, the substitutability of programmes, and the expected benefits to advertisers from contacting viewers. The equilibrium amount of programming may also be below or above the socially optimal level. Perhaps surprisingly, the ability to price programming may reduce social surplus, while monopoly ownership may increase it.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Competition in two-sided markets
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“This assumption is implicit in the Hotelling model, variants of which are frequently used in the two-sided markets literature (Parker and Van Alstyne 2000a, Armstrong 2002, Rochet and Tirole 2003, Armstrong 2006, Armstrong and Wright 2007, Anderson and Coate 2005, Kaiser and Wright 2006).”
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Self-citationPlatform Siphoning: Ad-Avoidance and Media Content
Anderson, S. P., & Gans, J. S. (2011) · American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.3.4.1 · Cited by 87
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Metadata
- Authors
- Anderson, S. P., & Coate, S.
- Venue
- Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2005-10
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 947-972
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W1975118206
- Cited by
- 622
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 61.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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