Unification by Fiat: Arrested Development of Predictive Processing
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Predictive processing (PP) has been repeatedly presented as a unificatory account of perception, action, and cognition. In this paper, we argue that this is premature: As a unifying theory, PP fails to deliver general, simple, homogeneous, and systematic explanations. By examining its current trajectory of development, we conclude that PP remains only loosely connected both to its computational framework and to its hypothetical biological underpinnings, which makes its fundamentals unclear. Instead of offering explanations that refer to the same set of principles, we observe systematic equivocations in PP‐based models, or outright contradictions with its avowed principles. To make matters worse, PP‐based models are seldom empirically validated, and they are frequently offered as mere just‐so stories. The large number of PP‐based models is thus not evidence of theoretical progress in unifying perception, action, and cognition. On the contrary, we maintain that the gap between theory and its biological and computational bases contributes to the arrested development of PP as a unificatory theory. Thus, we urge the defenders of PP to focus on its critical problems instead of offering mere re‐descriptions of known phenomena, and to validate their models against possible alternative explanations that stem from different theoretical assumptions. Otherwise, PP will ultimately fail as a unified theory of cognition.
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Citations
Cites
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
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Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind
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The Predictive Coding Account of Psychosis
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Cited by
Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness
Hohwy, J., & Seth, A. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.64 · Cited by 170
Laying down a forking path: tensions between enaction and the free energy principle
Di Paolo, E., Thompson, E., & Beer, R. (2022) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2022.9187 · Cited by 94
The overfitted brain: Dreams evolved to assist generalization
Hoel, E. (2021) · Patterns · doi:10.1016/j.patter.2021.100244 · Cited by 70
“Despite its origins in the field of machine learning, the predictive processing approach is controversial due to its claims of universality: it is unclear that the cortex actually functions primarily to generate predictions about its own future state.(112) Furthermore, there are fundamental criticisms about whether mi…”
BackgroundThe myth of the Bayesian brain
Mangalam, M. (2025) · European Journal of Applied Physiology · doi:10.1007/s00421-025-05855-6 · Cited by 14
“This linguistic slippage becomes particularly acute in expressions like “the brain minimizes prediction error” or “neurons encode precision weights”—phrases implying mechanistic claims while remaining shielded from falsification by their metaphorical status (Litwin and Miłkowski 2020).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Litwin, P., & Miłkowski, M.
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2020-06-27
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- e12867-e12867
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- OpenAlex
- W3037408783
- Cited by
- 86
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 6.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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