The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying
Abstract
We examine the determinants and value effects of corporate lobbying, controlling for corporate political action committee (PAC) campaign contributions. We find evidence that firms with greater potential payoffs from favorable policy and regulations lobby most actively, and that managers often utilize both lobbying and campaign contribution channels to influence the political climate affecting the firm. We also find that shareholders value the lobbying activities pursued by management on their behalf, particularly if the firm does not have a PAC that contributed to an election campaign. The results are robust to a number of tests designed to mitigate potential omitted‐variable and self‐selection bias.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hill, M. D., Kelly, G. W., Lockhart, G. B., & Van Ness, R. A.
- Venue
- Financial Management
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2013-09-23
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 931-957
- ISSN
- 0046-3892 (ISSN-L)
- 1755-053X
- OpenAlex
- W2332264805
- Cited by
- 266
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 47.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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