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Cited by 90Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceAnimal Law and WelfarePhilosophical Ethics and Theory

Animal Pain

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Allen, Colin·2004·Noûs
DOI 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00486.x
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Abstract

Which nonhuman animals experience conscious pain? 1 This question is central to the debate about animal welfare, as well as being of basic interest to scientists and philosophers of mind.Nociception -the capacity to sense noxious stimuli -is one of the most primitive sensory capacities.Neurons functionally specialized for nociception have been described in invertebrates such as the leech Hirudo medicinalis and the marine snail Aplysia californica (Walters 1996).Is all nociception accompanied by conscious pain, even in relatively primitive animals such as Aplysia, or is it the case, as some philosophers continue to maintain, that conscious experiences are the exclusive province of human beings?What philosophical and scientific resources are presently available for assessing claims lying between these extremes?These questions are of practical as well as theoretical concern.The first section of this essay describes the practical issues both as they relate to weaknesses in current animal welfare law and as they relate to the insufficiency of existing philosophical work on pain to support the development of more adequate regulations.In the second and third sections I evaluate recent philosophical arguments for and against the attribution of conscious pain to animals, and explain how scientific work on humans and other animals undermines these arguments.The final section on the biological functions of pain argues that philosophical work in this area has relied on overly simple ideas about the functions of pain.Recent scientific work suggests a more nuanced view about the functions of pain, and provides us the best hope for progress in understanding the nature of pain and its distribution in the animal kingdom. ANIMAL PAIN AND THE LAWLaws designed to promote animal welfare are coming under increasing legal scrutiny, and the trend is towards giving them broader scope.For instance, the 1986 British Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act (ASPA) was amended in 1993 to extend protection to all mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, amphibia, and the common octopus, Octopus vulgaris.Bill C-17 introduced into the Canadian parliament in 1999 and superceded by Bill C-15 in 2001 sought to expand the scope of animal protections, representing the first overhaul of that country's laws since the 19th century.And in the United States, a 1999 lawsuit brought against the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the agency charged with enforcing the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA), sought to challenge the agency's policy of exempting researchers maintaining rats, mice, and birds, from certain AWA requirements.2 In an out-of-court settlement, the USDA agreed to extend its regulations to the previously exempted species, although this agreement was undermined by Congressional action in 2002 which amended the AWA so as to encode the exemptions for rats, mice, and birds (but mandates that USDA report to Congress in 2003 on consequences of including those animals).While many researchers see increased regulation as a threat to scientific progress, they also recognize that there is no scientific or theoretical justification for excluding rats or mice from regulation under the AWA. 31

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  • If an animal is able to do trace conditioning on some stimulus, then that is some evidence, albeit not conclusive evidence, that it consciously perceives that stimulus.

    “If we find that an animal is able to do trace conditioning on some stimulus, then that is some evidence, albeit not conclusive evidence, that it consciously perceives that stimulus [26,27].”

    From Dimensions of Animal Consciousness (2020) · cites this paper as [26]

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Research works printed but not linked: 15

  1. [2]2. Allen, C. (1998). Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 10: 217-225.
  2. [8]8. Carruthers, P. (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  3. [10]10. Coghill, R.C. (1999). "Brain Mechanisms Supporting the Pain Experience," in M. Max, ed., Pain 1999 - An Updated Review. Seattle: IASP Press, pp. 67-76.
  4. [24]24. Bekoff, C. Allen, & G.M. Burghardt, eds., The Cognitive Animal. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 363-370.
  5. [27]27. Jamieson, D. (1998). "Science, Knowledge, and Animals Minds," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 98: 79-102.
  6. [29]29. Keefe, F.J., Bradley, L.A. & Main, C.J. (1999). "Psychological Assessment of Pain for the General Clinician," in M. Max, ed., Pain 1999 -An Updated Review. Seattle: IASP Press, pp. 219-232.
  7. [32]32. Meagher, M.W., Ferguson, A.R., McLemore, S., King, T.E., Sieve, A.N., Crown, E.D. & Grau, J.W. (2001). "Stress-Induced Hyperalgesia: Generality," Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 27: 219-238.
  8. [37]37. Orlans, B. (1997). "Pain: Invasiveness Scales for Judging Animal Experiments" in Bekoff & C. Meaney, eds., Encyclopedia of Animal Welfare. Westport, CT: Greenwood, pp. 267-269.
  9. [39]39. Perrett, R.W. (1997). Journal of Applied Philosophy, 14 (1997): 49-58.
  10. [40]40. Povinelli, D.J. (1996). "Chimpanzee Theory of Mind?" in P. Carruthers & P. Smith, eds., Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  11. [42]42. Regan, T. (1983). The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  12. [43]43. Rey, R. (1989). The History of Pain. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  13. [49]49. Singer, P. (1990). Animal Liberation, Revised edition. New York: Avon Books.
  14. [51]51. Sober, E. (2000a). Philosophy of Biology, Second Edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
  15. [58]58. von Kluge, S. & Brush, R. (1992). "Conditioned Taste and Taste-Potentiated Odor Aversions in the Syracuse High-and Low-Avoidance Strains of Rats." Journal of Comparative Psychology, 106: 248-253.

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Authors
Allen, C.
Corresponding author
Allen, Colin
ORCID
Allen, Colin
Venue
Noûs
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2004-11-04
Volume
38
Issue
4
Pages
617-643
ISSN
  • 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0068
DOI
10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00486.x
OpenAlex
W4212796044
Cited by
90
References
49
Citations by year
2025: 2 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 5
FWCI
0.95
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)
Locations
  • Noûs (publishedVersion)
  • IUScholarWorks (Indiana University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Law › Animal Law and Welfare
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Keywords
animal pain, nociception, animal welfare legislation, animal sentience, Aplysia californica, Octopus vulgaris, Animal Welfare Act, animal research regulation, philosophy of mind, animal consciousness

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