CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 389

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Ownership as a Form of Corporate Governance

Connelly, Brian L., Hoskisson, Robert E., Tihanyi, Laszlo, Certo, S. Trevis·2010·Journal of Management Studies
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00929.x
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

Firm ownership is an increasingly influential form of corporate governance. Although firms might be owned by different types of owners, most studies examine owner influence on a particular firm outcome in isolation. This study synthesizes research from multiple disciplines on different types of owners and offers a unifying framework of governance through ownership. Using this framework, we describe the motivations of various types of owners, the tactics owners use to affect firms in which they are invested, and the dominant firm outcomes these owners seek to influence. We note how heightened managerial awareness of heterogeneous owner interests increases owner influence on firm‐level outcomes. We also provide a roadmap for future study and offer research questions about where scholars might turn their attention to better understand the role of owners in directing firm actions. Our study draws attention to emerging forms of ownership, such as hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds, and highlights the changing (and often competing) interests of shareholders and how this impacts theories of governance.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00929.x

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Show all 1 references

Research works printed but not linked: 153

  1. 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.09.008 · DOI
  2. 10.2307/2297860 · DOI
  3. 10.2307/2331397 · DOI
  4. 10.1111/j.1755-053X.2005.tb00116.x · DOI
  5. 10.2307/3003575 · DOI
  6. 10.1111/1468-0351.00011 · DOI
  7. 10.2307/2331202 · DOI
  8. 10.1111/1540-6261.00567 · DOI
  9. 10.5465/amj.2008.31767256 · DOI
  10. Bainbridge S. M., 2003, Response to increasing shareholder power, Northwestern University Law Review, 97, 547
  11. 10.1016/0304-405X(89)90088-3 · DOI
  12. 10.2307/256308 · DOI
  13. 10.1002/smj.652 · DOI
  14. Berle A., 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
  15. 10.1002/smj.4250140904 · DOI
  16. 10.2307/3003330 · DOI
  17. 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb03541.x · DOI
  18. 10.2307/1073662 · DOI
  19. Blasi J., 2003, In the company of owners: the truth about stock options and why every employee should have them, Academy of Management Perspectives, 20, 126
  20. 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199603)17:3<243::AID-SMJ802>3.0.CO;2-D · DOI
  21. 10.1002/smj.445 · DOI
  22. 10.1016/0304-405X(88)90047-5 · DOI
  23. Bruton G. D., 2009, Governance, ownership structure and performance of IPO firms: the impact of different types of private equity investors and legal institutions in two European nations, Strategic Management Journal, 31, 491, 10.1002/smj.822 · DOI
  24. 10.1111/j.1467-6486.1993.tb00319.x · DOI
  25. 10.1111/1540-6261.00601 · DOI
  26. 10.1111/j.1540-6520.2005.00066.x · DOI
  27. Bushee B. J., 1998, The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment, Accounting Review, 73, 305
  28. 10.1506/J4GU-BHWH-8HME-LE0X · DOI
  29. 10.1111/j.1745-6622.2004.00005.x · DOI
  30. 10.5465/amr.2003.10196754 · DOI
  31. 10.1002/smj.182 · DOI
  32. 10.1016/j.jbusvent.2003.03.002 · DOI
  33. 10.3905/joi.2005.479385 · DOI
  34. 10.1002/smj.463 · DOI
  35. Connelly B. L. Tihanyi L. Certo S. T.andHitt M. A.(in press). ‘Marching to the beat of different drummers: the influence of institutional owners on competitive actions.Academy of Management Journal in press.
  36. 10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00058-0 · DOI · Paper page
  37. Core J. E., 2003, Executive equity compensation and incentives: a survey, Economic Policy Review, 9, 27
  38. 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.04.008 · DOI
  39. 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.04.003 · DOI
  40. 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199803)19:3<269::AID-SMJ950>3.0.CO;2-K · DOI · Paper page
  41. 10.2307/30040673 · DOI
  42. 10.1080/078559806 · DOI
  43. 10.2307/257102 · DOI
  44. 10.2307/3069342 · DOI
  45. David P., Do shareholders or stakeholders appropriate the rents from corporate diversification? The influence of ownership structure, Academy of Management Journal
  46. 10.2307/2393496 · DOI
  47. 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00747.x · DOI
  48. 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00764.x · DOI
  49. 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00110-7 · DOI
  50. Del Guercio D. Seery L. J.andWoidtke T.(2008).Do Boards Pay Attention When Institutional Investor Activists Just Vote No?SSRN Working Paper No. 575242. · DOI
  51. 10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00020-7 · DOI
  52. 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.02.002 · DOI
  53. 10.1177/0149206307308588 · DOI
  54. 10.1287/orsc.1080.0359 · DOI
  55. 10.1257/jel.40.3.739 · DOI
  56. 10.1111/0022-1082.00150 · DOI
  57. 10.1111/j.1745-6622.2000.tb00069.x · DOI
  58. 10.1016/0883-9026(94)00019-Q · DOI
  59. 10.1016/S0883-9026(03)00027-2 · DOI
  60. 10.1002/smj.269 · DOI
  61. 10.1002/smj.465 · DOI
  62. Fotak V. Bortolotti B.andMegginson W.(2009).Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment Patterns and Performance. SSRN Working Paper No. 1364926. · DOI
  63. 10.2307/258648 · DOI
  64. 10.1177/0149206304271760 · DOI
  65. Ghoshal S., 2005, Bad management theories are destroying good management practices, Academy of Management Learning and Education, 33, 79
  66. 10.1111/j.1745-6622.2007.00125.x · DOI
  67. Gilson R. J., 2008, Sovereign wealth funds and corporate governance: a minimalist response to the new mercantilism, Stanford Law Review, 60, 1345
  68. 10.2307/30040616 · DOI
  69. 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05185.x · DOI
  70. 10.1162/003355301556392 · DOI
  71. 10.1002/smj.570 · DOI
  72. 10.2307/256611 · DOI
  73. 10.1111/j.1467-6486.1992.tb00676.x · DOI
  74. 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00765.x · DOI
  75. 10.1002/smj.287 · DOI
  76. 10.1046/j.1540-6261.2003.00608.x · DOI
  77. 10.1111/j.1468-5957.2007.02008.x · DOI
  78. Hermalin B. E., 2003, Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature, Economic Policy Review, 9, 7
  79. 10.1287/orsc.14.2.244.15160 · DOI
  80. 10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00025-2 · DOI
  81. 10.2307/256993 · DOI
  82. Holderness C. G., 2003, A survey of blockholders and corporate control, Economic Policy Review, 9, 51
  83. 10.2307/258018 · DOI
  84. 10.2307/3069305 · DOI
  85. 10.1016/j.jbusvent.2005.11.001 · DOI
  86. Jen S., 2007, Sovereign wealth funds: what they are and what's happening, World Economics, 8, 1
  87. Jensen M. C., 1989, Eclipse of the public corporation, Harvard Business Review, 67, 61
  88. 10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X · DOI · Paper page
  89. 10.1177/014920639602200304 · DOI
  90. 10.2307/256977 · DOI
  91. 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00930.x · DOI
  92. Jones D. C., 1995, The productivity effects of employee stock‐ownership plans and bonuses: evidence from Japanese panel data, American Economic Review, 85, 391
  93. 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199702)18:2<97::AID-SMJ855>3.0.CO;2-2 · DOI
  94. Kahan M.andRock E. B.(2009).Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control. SSRN Working Paper No. 919881.
  95. 10.1257/jep.23.1.121 · DOI
  96. 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2004.00160.x · DOI
  97. 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199601)17:1<73::AID-SMJ795>3.0.CO;2-N · DOI
  98. 10.2307/256355 · DOI
  99. Kruse D.andBlasi J.(1995).Employee Ownership Employee Attitudes and Firm Performance. NBER Working Paper No. 5277. National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge MA. · DOI
  100. 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199806)19:6<555::AID-SMJ955>3.0.CO;2-Y · DOI
  101. 10.1111/1540-6261.00422 · DOI
  102. 10.1111/j.1540-627X.2006.00151.x · DOI
  103. 10.1016/S0305-0483(01)00024-X · DOI
  104. Marcus B., 2005, Competing for Capital: Investor Relations in a Dynamic World
  105. 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.07.002 · DOI
  106. 10.2307/30040618 · DOI
  107. 10.1257/jel.39.2.321 · DOI
  108. 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03770.x · DOI
  109. 10.1016/0304-405X(94)00809-F · DOI
  110. 10.1086/226550 · DOI · Paper page
  111. 10.1016/0304-405X(85)90025-X · DOI
  112. 10.1016/0304-405X(88)90048-7 · DOI
  113. 10.1177/0149206305277797 · DOI
  114. 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.04.002 · DOI
  115. 10.1002/bse.364 · DOI
  116. 10.1002/smj.489 · DOI
  117. Perry T., 2000, CEO compensation in the 1990s: shareholder alignment or shareholder expropriation?, Wake Forest Law Review, 35, 123
  118. Pfeffer J., 1978, The External Control of Organizations: A Resource‐Dependence Perspective
  119. 10.5465/amr.1991.4279000 · DOI
  120. 10.1016/0304-405X(88)90046-3 · DOI
  121. 10.1016/S0378-4266(98)00044-2 · DOI · Paper page
  122. 10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00042-3 · DOI
  123. 10.1002/smj.204 · DOI
  124. 10.1002/smj.227 · DOI
  125. 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.04.005 · DOI
  126. 10.1111/j.1475-6803.1990.tb00534.x · DOI
  127. 10.2307/3003485 · DOI · Paper page
  128. 10.5465/amr.2002.7566068 · DOI
  129. 10.2307/30040613 · DOI
  130. Shirley M. M.andWalsh P.(2001).Public vs. Private Ownership: The Current State of the Debate. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2420. World Bank Washington DC. · DOI
  131. 10.1257/jep.12.4.133 · DOI · Paper page
  132. 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · DOI · Paper page
  133. 10.2307/1882010 · DOI
  134. Sundaramurthy C., 1998, Shareholder governance proposals and conflict of interests between inside and outside shareholders, Journal of Managerial Issues, 10, 30
  135. 10.2307/2235028 · DOI
  136. 10.1016/S1075-4253(98)00019-2 · DOI
  137. 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00707.x · DOI
  138. 10.2307/30040614 · DOI
  139. Turk T. A., 2007, The effect of takeover defenses on long term and short term analysts' earnings forecasts: the case of poison pills, Corporate Ownership and Control, 4, 127
  140. 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.005 · DOI
  141. 10.5465/AMJ.2007.26279210 · DOI
  142. 10.2307/258017 · DOI
  143. 10.5465/amr.2006.20208691 · DOI
  144. 10.1111/j.1468-0289.2006.00366.x · DOI
  145. 10.1177/014920639502100307 · DOI
  146. 10.2189/asqu.53.1.29 · DOI
  147. 10.1002/smj.653 · DOI
  148. 10.1111/1468-5957.00201 · DOI
  149. 10.5465/amr.2000.3363522 · DOI
  150. 10.2307/256787 · DOI
  151. 10.1002/smj.208 · DOI
  152. 10.1177/0149206304271766 · DOI
  153. 10.1016/S0883-9026(99)00052-X · DOI

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Metadata

Authors
Connelly, B. L., Hoskisson, R. E., Tihanyi, L., & Certo, S. T.
Venue
Journal of Management Studies
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2010-10-25
Volume
47
Issue
8
Pages
1561-1589
ISSN
  • 0022-2380
  • 1467-6486
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00929.x
Cited by
389
References
1
Language
en
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review